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List of abbreviations
BR – Belarusian Railways
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Weights, measures and other abbreviations
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eop – end of period
EUR – Euro
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m – million
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thsd – thousand
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USD – United States Dollar
yoy – year-on-year
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Foreword
This is the seventh issue of the Belarusian Infrastructure Monitoring (BIM). BIM was de-
signed by the IPM Research Center, an independent research body, together with the Ger-
man Economic Team in Belarus (GET). BIM is a tool used to assess the progress of struc-
tural reforms in key infrastructure industries and monitors annual changes in the infrastruc-
ture sector. The indicators developed within the BIM are intended both for monitoring the
government’s infrastructure policy and for research purposes.
The methodology used in BIM follows the concept of the Infrastructure Monitoring for Ukraine
(IMU) of the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) in Kiev, Ukraine.*
This concept is based on the approach developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), which estimates infrastructure indices for all transition countries.
Since 1998, these indices have been published annually in the EBRD Transition Report.
This report presents information on the restructuring of five infrastructure sectors of the
Belarusian economy in a standardized manner, which allows for cross-industry comparisons.
The monitored 21 indicators are qualitative and fall into three broad categories: (1) com-
mercialisation, (2) tariff reform, and (3) regulatory and institutional development. The
aggregated index calculated on the basis of indicators presenting the status of the reforms
in each sector at a given period.
Following this foreword, a short summary will outline the major developments within se-
lected sectors of the infrastructure. The second section describes the perspectives of Be-
larus’ energy sector in the new Eastern Partnership program of the EU. A general analysis
of the Belarusian infrastructure policies is presented in the third section. This detailed re-
view of the reforms in each of the five sectors includes not only ex-post analysis, but also
an outline of the major challenges and prospects for future sustainable development. A
description of the reform progress in each infrastructure sector supplements the numeri-
cal evaluation and provides a broader view of the situation. Appendices summarize the
evaluation in tabular form and provide methodological explanations and detailed comments
for each indicator.
* See www.ier.kiev.ua.
6GERMAN ECONOMIC TEAM IN BELARUSIPM RESEARCH CENTER
1. Summary
During the year of 2009, like in previous years, infrastructure industries did not see any
substantial structural changes but a continuing reluctance to introduce cost based pricing.
The changes in regulatory framework in the railway sector did not improve the overall sit-
uation, but they can be considered as signs of possible future privatisation deals. The reg-
ulatory framework in the road and telecommunications sectors remained unchanged. The
situation in the natural gas and electricity sector slightly improved concerning paying off
the arrears of previous years but worsened with respect to the cost reflectiveness of tar-
iffs.
The railway sector’s index did not change in 2009, remaining at 1.4 with the railway
operator Belarusian Railways (BR) preserving its monopoly status. In 2009, no changes in
the ownership, structure, operation and state financing of Belarusian Railways occurred.
However, there has been official recognition of the necessity to reorganize Belarusian Rail-
ways, transferring social infrastructure to local administrations and privatizing non-core lines
of business. Some entities of BR have been listed for privatisation in 2010, which slightly
increased the subindex of ownership from 1.3 to 1.4. Besides, there was a significant rise
of the cost coverage in the local transportation sector, due to grown tariffs, that led to the
“structure of tariffs” subindex improvement from 1.7 to 1.8.
The road sector’s index has not changed either, indicating the absence of any significant
reforms or changes in the sector. The passenger and freight carriers benefited from the tax
simplification and overall liberalisation intentions. The most negative development observed
within the sector was the reduction of the financing for road construction and maintenance
which resulted in a deterioration of the quality of the roads in Belarus.
The telecommunications’ index remained at 2.1 in 2009. There were no significant chang-
es in the sector’s regulatory environment, as the government postponed changes to the law
“On Telecommunications”. Beltelecom remains the monopolistic provider of the majority of
telecommunication services (excluding mobile connections). Some developments in 2009
were primarily associated with an increased competition for customers in the mobile con-
nections segment, because of decreasing returns per subscriber after the international fi-
nancial crisis. Mobile operators and Beltelecom also made considerable investments in new
communication technologies (3G, WiMax, WiFi etc.). Although the profitability of the com-
panies in the telecommunication sector in Belarus is relatively high, compared to other
sectors in the economy, it has been gradually decreasing. Cross-subsidisation in the land-
lines segment and a high level of government intrusion in independent companies’ opera-
tions lead to over-rated tariffs for several telecommunication services.
In 2009 there were no considerable structural reforms implemented in the gas sector. As
planned, Gazprom acquired another 12.5% of Beltransgaz shares. Household tariffs re-
mained below costs and industrial tariffs. Although improvements in payment discipline
continued, consumers’ debts have still not been fully repaid. These changes, however, had
not impact on the IPM reform index in gas sector in 2009, remaining at a level of 2.0.
No significant changes were implemented in the electricity sector in 2009. Despite still
low natural gas prices and increasing tariffs (in local currency) the cash-flow of Belenergo
remained insufficient to finance necessary investments. Cross-subsidisation continued to
be an important issue. In general, due to lack of essential changes, the index remained at
the level of previous years: 1.7.
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Source: Own calculations.
Figure 1:
IPM Research Center’s infrastructure reform indices for Belarus
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2. Eastern Partnership: Prospects for Intensifying the Belarus – EU
Relations in the Energy Sector?1
2.1. Introduction
The Eastern Partnership is a multilateral policy framework for the relations between the EU,
its eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and the Caucasus countries (Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia). It is intended “to create the necessary conditions to accelerate
political association and further economic integration between the European Union and
interested partner countries”.2
The Eastern Partnership emerged from the European Neighbourhood Policy that formed the
framework for the EU external policy towards most of its neighbouring countries since 2004.
While the Polish-Swedish initiative from spring 2008 for a special eastern dimension of the
European Neighbourhood Policy faced some initial reluctance in Brussels; the Russian-
Georgian conflict in summer 2008 changed the political climate in favour of a regional policy.
Consequently, the European Commission presented a far reaching document on Eastern
Partnership, which also found a favourable response from the European Council in December.
The Czech EU Presidency took the project forward organizing an Eastern Summit of the EU
and the six partner countries in Prague in May 2009. There, the Eastern Partnership was
officially inaugurated.
Belarus has expressed high hopes associated with its partnership. Strong media echo in
Belarus and repeated optimistic statements by Belarusian politicians indicated that Belarus
attach high importance to this new development in the Belarus-EU relations. This positive
Belarusian stance towards the Eastern Partnership could be attributed to different politi-
cal and economic factors.
In particular, Belarus considers it advantageous to participate in EU cooperation programmes
targeted on its Eastern neighbours, from a large part of which it has been excluded in the
past. While, for some countries, such as Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership might just be a
different label for the already close cooperation, for Belarus the Eastern Partnership could
imply a completely new dimension of collaboration. Even though Belarus was an official
member of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it was excluded from the Partner-
ship and Cooperation Agreements and the linked ENP Action Plans due to disagreement over
common values (e.g. democracy and human rights). Thus, Belarus hopes that the Eastern
Partnership will add further momentum to the currently observable relaxation of the EU-
Belarus relations. This easing of tension was indicated by the visit of Belarusian foreign
minister, Syarhei Martynau, to Brussels, EU high commissioner for foreign and security policy
affairs, Javier Solana, to Minsk and External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner
to Minsk.3  Whether, and under which conditions this hope will materialize is a political
question that is beyond the scope of this study.4  We will also not treat the strategic polit-
ical dimension of the Eastern Partnership (relations of the EU and Belarus with Russia5 ,
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, EU membership perspective of the Eastern
1 This chapter is a reprint of the IPM Policy Paper: Zachmann, G., Giucci, R. (2009). Eastern Partnership:
Prospects for Intensifying the Belarus – EU Relations in the Energy Sector? IPM – GET Policy paper PP/
08/09.
2 EC (2009a).
3 EIU (2009).
4 EC (2008).
5 The reluctance of Russia to dispense a USD 500 m credit to Belarus (and other economy related disputes)
might have, for example, motivated the Belarus administration to demonstrate to their “strategic part-
ner” that they have alternative foreign policy options.
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Partnership countries, relation between Eastern Partnership and Union for the Mediterra-
nean etc.) that are widely discussed elsewhere.6
The focus of this contribution is the energy policy section in the Eastern Partnership. En-
ergy is an crucial component in the past, present and future cooperation between the EU
and Belarus. For the EU member states, Belarus is an important energy transit country.7
For Belarus the EU could be a principal investor in energy infrastructure. In the somewhat
comparable, though much bigger Ukraine, companies, countries and international financial
organisations from the EU invested/lend billions of Euros in transmission lines, power plants
and pipelines. A similar cooperation could be of high value for Belarus as it might provide
external financial resources that help to renew the largely worn out energy infrastructure,
stabilize the crisis-affected macroeconomic situation and restructure the inefficient ener-
gy sector.
Therefore we first want to analyze in which aspects the Eastern Partnership goes beyond
existing policies. Second, we want to line out the energy related EU programmes in which
Belarus is participating and what could be expected from the Eastern Partnership. Based
on this analysis we will describe how Belarus could increase the benefits from this cooper-
ation.
2.2. What is “new” in the Eastern Partnership
In this section the bilateral and multilateral cooperation programmes between the EU and
Belarus are described. Based on a brief introduction of previous and existing programmes
the “new” features of the Eastern Partnership are presented.
The Eastern Partnership is not the first EU policy programme towards a closer cooperation
with Belarus. Until 31 December 2006, EU assistance to the countries of the European
Neighbourhood Policy was provided under various geographical programmes including
TACIS8  for EUs eastern neighbours (including Belarus) and Russia. For the budgetary pe-
riod 2000–2006, the funds available were approximately EUR 3.1 bn for TACIS, as well as
approximately EUR 500 m in European Investment Bank lending for the TACIS beneficiary
region.
From 1 January 2007 onwards, various programmes have been replaced by the European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The main focus is on country pro-
grammes that support the partners’ countries implementation of their own political, gov-
ernance, economic and social reform programmes. The ENPI is responsible for both the
southern and the eastern neighbours. For the current budgetary period (2007–2013), ap-
proximately EUR 12 bn in EU funding are available to support these partners’ reforms.
According to the preliminary draft of the general EU budget for 2010 (see Figure 2) a large
fraction of ENPI funds is dedicated to the southern neighbours. The budget lines also rel-
evant for the cooperation between the EU and Belarus are: “Political governance reform –
eastern neighbours”, “sustainable development – eastern neighbours”, “projects in eastern
neigbours”, “cross-border cooperation”, “regional cooperation among eastern neigbours” and
6 IFRI (2009a), IFRI (2009b), Bertelsmann (2009), SWP (2009).
7 In its Second Strategic Energy Review the EU commission postulates that “A strategy on Belarus should
be developed, taking account of its importance as a neighbour and transit country”. Second Strategic
Energy Review, 13.11.2008, COM (2008) 781 final.
8 TACIS stands for Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States. The TACIS Pro-
gramme provided grant-financed technical assistance to 12 countries to “support their transition to dem-
ocratic market-oriented economies”. In the energy sector various national programmes were financed
by TACIS: e.g., “Support to the Ministry of Energy Armenia”, “Coal sector policy support Ukraine”. In ad-
dition, multilateral programmes like the “INOGATE Programme” and the “Nuclear safety programme” were
financed from the TACIS budget.
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“Erasmus Mundus”. This EUR 400 m (of the total EUR 1.7 bn) for 2010 will have to be shared
with at least five other countries, some of which are most probably higher on EU’s priority
list.
Figure 2:
ENPI funding for 2010
Source: Draft of EU Budget for 2010.
The ENPI website lists 18 support programmes in which Belarus participates whereby some
are significantly better funded then others.9  In the context of ENPI (and former TACIS), six
important multilateral programmes could be highlighted:
− Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC): a large fraction of ENPI funds is spent on cross-
border cooperation of the EU and the partner countries to enhance the territorial co-
hesion. For the Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus Programme EUR 42 m are foreseen in 2007–
2013 and for the Poland–Belarus–Ukraine Programme EUR 186 m are planned.
− Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX): is an EU programme to or-
ganize workshops and short-term visits of EU and member states experts to improve
the administrative capacities in the partner countries. In 2008 Belarus significantly
reduced its participation in the corresponding programme (2007: 309; 2008: 79 par-
ticipants).
9 On http://www.enpi-info.eu/list_projects_east.php?country=58 [last visit: 1 October 2009] one can find:
1. Air Quality Governance in the ENPI East Partner Countries;
2. CBC - Cross-border cooperation;
3. EAST-INVEST - Support to SME Sector in ENP Eastern Partner Countries;
4. Eastern Partnership Culture Programme – Part I;
5. Erasmus Mundus II – Action 2 Partnerships;
6. FLEG - Improving Forest Law Enforcement and Governance;
7. INOGATE;
8-11. Multi-country cooperation instruments (East): NIF, TWINNING, TAIEX, SIGMA;
12. Prevention of Drug Abuse and Fight against Drug Trafficking - BUMAD 3;
13. Regional Information & Communication Programme;
14. SKPI - Support to Kyoto Protocol Implementation;
15. TEMPUS IV for higher education;
16. The EU Water Initiative (EUWI) – Eastern Component;
17. TRACECA;
18. Water Governance in Western EECCA Countries.
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− Twinning: is a long-term expert delegation programme. EU and Member States’ ad-
ministration staff is send to partner countries public services to assist in capacity
building. Currently, Belarus does not participate, inter alia because Belarus law for-
bids officials to work together with officials from a foreign state.10
− Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF): is a fund to support international financial
institutions (such as EBRD and EIB) lending in the 16 ENP partner countries. Large
scale lending by EIB and EBRD has been slightly topped up (0–5% contribution) from
the EUR 700 m seven years budget of the NIF. Belarus did so far not profit from NIF
support.
− Governance Facility: additional support (EUR 50 m annually) to the partner country
that has made most progress in implementing the governance priorities agreed in their
Action Plans. Belarus did so far not profit from a Governance Facility.
− Inogate: is an international energy co-operation programme that aims to stimulate
the technical and legal convergence of the national energy sectors by facilitating IFI
investment in energy transportation infrastructure and providing technical, financial,
legal and environmental expertise. So far, Belarus only participates in some smaller
“standard harmonisation” projects.
While countries like Ukraine or Georgia were in the focus of the mentioned programmes for
years, Belarus was for political reasons so far largely excluded from EU support.11  As for
example only countries that have signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements have ENP
Action Plans, Belarus was in general not eligible to projects in the frame of the Neighbour-
hood Investment Facility (NIF) or money from the Governance Facility.
Direct bilateral programmes in the framework of the ENPI are laid out in the Country Strat-
egy Paper 2007–2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007–2010. The National Indic-
ative Programme identifies two priority areas of assistance to Belarus: “Social and Economic
Development” and “Democratic Development and Good Governance”. Based on the National
Indicative Programme concrete Annual Action Programmes are developed. Those quite
specific annual ENPI Action Programmes in which Belarus participates are not to be con-
founded with the more strategic three year ENP Action Plans from which Belarus was so far
banned. The Action Programme 2007 relates to the energy sector, the Action Programme
2008 deals with environmental issues and the Action Programme for 2009 is concerned with
food safety. The last programme has been financed by the EU with EUR 10 m.12  As indi-
cated in Table 1 the corresponding budget allocation for 2007–2010 is negligible.
Table 1:
Distribution of ENPI budget line in 2007 and country programmes indicative funding 2007–
2010 in EUR m
Source: ENPI.
Conclusion: The described examples indicate that Belarus has already been involved in
numerous EU programmes before 2009. For lack of own interest (TAIEX), absent legal basis
in Belarus (Twinning) and EU’s reluctance to engage in large bilateral investment (NIF) most
of the programmes are either narrowly focused (FLEG), sparsely funded (Action Pro-
grammes) and/or part of large multilateral projects (CBC).
10 In 2007-2013 the budget for Twinning for all south and east ENPI countries is Euro 12 bn.
11 Funds allocated to individual country programmes depend on their needs and absorption capacity as well
as their implementation of agreed reforms. [http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=340&id_type=2].
12 Commission Decision C(2009) 4274 of 09/06/2009.
 Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
2007–2010 98 92 20 120 210 494 
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Based on the brief description of the status quo ante the new cooperation programmes in
the framework of the Eastern Partnership should be introduced. In principle there will be
biannual meetings of Heads of States or Governments involving the 27 EU Member States
and the partner countries of the Eastern Partnership. Annual meetings of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs would review progress and provide more detailed political guidance.
Apart of this general declaration of intention to more closely coordinate on the highest
political level13, three new features of the Eastern Partnership that have economic policy
implications, could be identified:14  “multilateral thematic platforms”, “flagship initiatives”
and increased funding.
The thematic platforms should provide a framework in which common multilateral chal-
lenges can be addressed. This includes seminars to improve the understanding of EU leg-
islation and standards, sharing of experience, and where appropriate development of joint
activities. Four policy platforms exist: (1) Democracy, good governance and stability; (2)
Economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies; (3) Energy security; and
(4) Contacts between people.
In each thematic platform senior officials hold regular meetings (twice a year in Brussels).
The first meeting round took place in summer 2009.15  According to the General Guidelines
“each platform will adopt a set of realistic, core objectives that should be updated period-
ically, with a corresponding work programme, and will review the progress achieved” and
can establish expert-level working groups (panels). So far no information on the decided
objectives or eventual working groups are made public. Consequently, it remains to be seen,
whether this official discussion forum will become successful. Unless the partner countries
see no real decision making power with respect to budget allocations it is, however, possi-
ble that the partner countries will prefer to employ their scarce administrative resources
elsewhere, i.e., withdraw their best experts from the platforms.
A promising approach to quickly demonstrate the capacity of EU programmes and build
capacity in the partner countries administration are the flagship initiatives. In the Pra-
gue declaration five areas for “flagships” have been defined: (1) Integrated Border Man-
agement Programme, (2) SME Facility, (3) Regional electricity markets, improved energy
13 Currently, the most largely covered initiative in the Eastern Partnership is the Civil Society Forum.
14 The ten “new points“ in the Eastern Partnership according to the press releases of the European Com-
mission (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/217) are not all innova-
tions of the Eastern Partnership. Most of them (all apart of 6, 9 and 10) simply carry forward existing
policies:
1. Voluntary new association agreements including free trade agreements;
2. EU funded programmes to improve partners’ administrative absorption capacity;
3. “Mobility and security pacts”, allowing for easier legitimate travel to the EU;
4. EU wants to study the possibilities for increased labour mobility;
5. Enhance energy security in the partner countries;
6. Multilateral platforms;
7. Enhanced cooperation on environment and climate issues;
8. Increased people-to-people contacts and greater involvement of civil society;
9. Additional financial support of EUR 350 m for the period till 2013;
10. Flagship initiatives.
15 “According to the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, the multilateral framework
of the Eastern Partnership will provide for cooperation activities and open and free dialogue serving the
objectives of the Partnership. It will operate on a basis of joint decisions of the European Union and the
partner countries. It will provide a forum to share information and experience on the partner countries’
steps towards transition, reform and modernisation and give the EU an additional instrument to accom-
pany these processes. It will facilitate the development of common positions and joint activities. The
multilateral framework is aimed at fostering links among partner countries themselves and will be a fo-
rum for discussion on further developments of the Eastern Partnership.“ Source: Eastern Partnership Mul-
tilateral Platforms - General Guidelines and Rules of Procedure, Brussels, 5th June 2009.
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efficiency and increased use of renewable energy sources, (4) Southern energy corridor, (5)
Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters.
By September 2009 two flagships (1 and 5) were prepared to be launched in the end of
2009. To give a rough idea on the financial dimension, in the first phase EUR 6 m are aimed
for flagship 5 while significantly more should be spend in the second phase.16  Overall the
Commission proposals for flagships 2, 3 and 5 foresee mainly technical assistance to im-
prove coordination but seem to allow/encourage financial assistance from international
financial institutions.
The third highlight of the Eastern Partnership is the additional financial support of EUR
350 m for 2010–2013 (2010: EUR 25 m; 2011: EUR 53 m; 2012: EUR 113 m; 2013: EUR
159 m). However, “the Commission would need Council approval for allocations to Eastern
partner countries on an annual basis, which would enable other claims on the margins and
other external relations priorities to be considered”.17  Consequently, in extreme situations
the Eastern Partnership funding might not be fully assured.
Moreover EUR 250 m that was already allocated to the ENP regional east programme will
be reallocated to initiatives relevant for the implementation of the Eastern Partnership,
bringing the total for implementing this new initiative to EUR 600 m.18
According to SIPU (2009) the Commission proposes that the new funds should be used to
finance the multilateral elements of the Eastern Partnership. Remaining funds should be
divided roughly equally between the economic and social development objective (~ EUR
75 m) and the multilateral dimension (~ EUR 75 m). The multilateral dimension will pre-
sumably cover the work within the thematic platforms and certain of the flagship projects.
Obviously this level of finance is insufficient on its own to fund the envisaged major flag-
ship projects.
The reason for this lack of funding is that the Eastern Partnership was decided in the mid-
dle of the budget period 2007–2013. Consequently, the resources had to be found within
the existing financial framework and were therefore fairly constrained. However, the de-
scribed large number of projects acknowledged by the EU but not properly funded could
also be interpreted as a promise for the next budget period (2014–2020). SIPU estimates
that while the total EU-Budget will not increase markedly rescheduling of financing lines
might, conditional on political will, allow an Eastern Partnership funding between EUR 1.5
bn and EUR 3 bn in 2013 prices. Such an adjustment of budget priorities will, however,
probably meet the opposition from southern member states and accession critical countries.
Therefore, good progress in the partner countries might help to find arguments for such an
increase in Eastern Partnership funding. Another source of finance probably envisaged by
the EU was co-financing from interested (central European) member states and international
financial institutions.
Apart of the new instruments and the improved finance for programmes in the eastern
neighbourhood, the most important point for Belarus in the Eastern Partnership might be
the fact that is allowed to participate. The decision to make Belarus a full member of the
Eastern Partnership was not uncontested but followed an obvious relaxation in the EU-
Belarus relations. Those were indicated by a series of high ranking visits in 2009: Belaru-
sian foreign minister, Syarhei Martynau to Brussels, EU high commissioner for foreign and
16 Source: Presentation of DG RELEX: “Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-
made disasters An Eastern partnership Flagship initiative”.
17 UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee. A part of the Eastern Partnership budget comes
from a margin under heading 4 of the ENP budget, thought as a reserve in crisis situations in the neigh-
bourhood countries, e.g. in Palestine.
18 “Available funding was reduced to this level during negotiations within the Commission” (SIPU).
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security policy affairs, Javier Solana to Minsk and External Relations Commissioner Benita
Ferrero-Waldner to Minsk.
Despite its full member status in the Eastern Partnership, Belarus participation in bilateral
projects remains conditioned on “the overall development of EU - Belarus relations”. This
implies that decisions on concrete projects are subject to a case-by-case decision by the
EU. On the one hand it is probable that the criteria for funding Belarusian proposals might
be stricter than those for other countries; on the other hand the case-by-case approach does
not categorically preclude any type of project.
Conclusion: the Eastern Partnership does not leave the path of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy19  but slightly widened its scope. While especially the flagship projects indicate
a significant increase in the scale of European engagement in the region, the funding in the
current EU budget period (2007–2013) is rather modest. This could be interpreted as a
promise for the coming EU-budget (2014–2020) to adjust the means to the aims. For Be-
larus, being in the Eastern Partnership is potentially more important than for other part-
ner countries. While Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova were already on track towards a closer
integration in the European market Belarus would have risked being uncoupled from this
regional dynamics.20  Concerning funding, however, the Eastern Partnership is also for Be-
larus more a promise than a reality as bilateral investments remain restraint to political
conditions.
2.3. EU – Belarus cooperation in the energy sector
In the first part of this section existing programmes of cooperation between the EU and
Belarus in the energy sector are presented. The new instruments under the Eastern Part-
nership are discussed in the second part.
Under National Indicative Programme 2007–2010, energy sector issues are considered as
a part of the first priority area (“social and economic development”). Consequently, ener-
gy was the subject of the 2007 ENPI Annual Action Programme. In addition, climate change
and electricity network issues have also been part of the TACIS regional action programme
2006. Including multilateral programmes, we were able to identify five ongoing EU projects
in the field of energy that involve Belarus:
− Support to the Implementation of a Comprehensive Energy Policy for the
Republic of Belarus: This ongoing study funded by EUR 5 m is carried out under the
ENPI Annual Action Plan 2007.
− Safety and security of main gas transit infrastructure in Eastern Europe and
the Caucasus: This TACIS project that is implemented by INOGATE involves six coun-
tries. The total funding of EUR 1 m should be used to study the losses in the gas
network and coordinate the corresponding policies. Based on the studies projects are
to be promoted to the IFIs for financial support.
− Harmonisation of technical standards and practices in the oil and gas sector
in Europe and Northern Caucasus: This multilateral TACIS project has a total bud-
get of EUR 2.8 m.
− Harmonisation of electricity standards: This multilateral TACIS project (concerns
INOGATE countries) has a total budget of EUR 1.5 m.
19 Fride (2009).
20 SIPU (2009): “The proposal on bilateral relations in the Eastern Partnership is fundamentally to extend
the offer which has already been made to Ukraine to the other five countries of the region. This means
that, when they are ready, the other five countries will be offered the chance to negotiate an Associa-
tion Agreement with the European Union.”
GERMAN ECONOMIC TEAM IN BELARUSIPM RESEARCH CENTER
15
− Support to the extension of the Covenant of Mayors to NIS countries: The
objective of this project under consideration is to encourage and support local author-
ities to achieve a more sustainable local energy policy.
Besides this rather limited EU programmes, bilateral technical assistance agencies and
international financial institutions are also active in the Belarus energy sector.
International Financial Cooperation (IFC): The “Belarus Energy Efficiency Survey
Project” is the only energy sector project of IFC in Belarus. The main goal of this ongoing
technical advisory project is to assess the current market for energy efficiency (EE) financing
in Belarus.
UN Development Programme/Global Environment Facility (UNDP/GEF): The GEF
is the second largest foreign donor in the Belarus energy sector. So far two major projects
are/were conducted: (1) Between 2003 and 2007 the “Biomass energy for heating and hot
water supply” project was a USD 9 m (USD 3 m by GEF) initiative to promote biomass usage
in Belarus. (2) A second project running from 2006 to 2010 “Removing barriers to energy
efficiency improvements in the State sector in Belarus” supports local authorities and state
enterprises in identifying energy efficiency opportunities, particularly in the distributed
heating and combined heat and power sector. The total projects budget is USD 9 m (USD
1.6 m by GEF).
World Bank: The World Bank has been the most active donor in the energy sector in Be-
larus. In spring 2009 the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank approved a USD
125 m loan to the Republic of Belarus to support a USD 193 m Energy Efficiency Project
aimed at improving energy efficiency in heat and power generation in selected towns in
Belarus. This is the largest World Bank project in Belarus. In addition World Bank also con-
ducted the “Social Sector Energy Retrofitting Project” (USD 23 m) and the related “Climate
Change Pilot Project” (USD 1 m).
German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ): The GTZ conducted projects on sustain-
able restructuring of energy systems in buildings and the promotion of renewable energies.
This incomplete (but indicative) compilation of energy sector projects by international donors
indicates that Belarus has until 2008 received only very modest support. Many important
international financial institutions, very active in neighbouring countries (e.g., EBRD, KfW)
were not involved in the Belarus energy sector. Up to 2008 Belarus attracted less than USD
50 m from all donors (EU, bilateral and IFIs) in the entire energy sector. In the same peri-
od Ukraine was able to attract projects for its electricity sector from the World Bank alone,
worth USD 877 m. In 2009 the climate apparently changed with the first significant loan
to the Belarus energy sector by the World Bank and the discussions within the EBRD to
potentially get active in the Belarus energy sector.
In the remainder of this section we thus want to analyse whether the instruments of the
Eastern Partnership in the Energy Sector could contribute to the upsurge in donor activity.
Being mentioned several times in the relevant documents, energy is as an important com-
ponent in the Eastern Partnership.21  Actually, two instruments of the Eastern Partnership
practically deal with the energy sector: the third platform and the third flagship. Both should
be briefly introduced:
The “Energy Security” Platform is a high-level discussion forum in which representatives
of the EU Commission (in particular from the Directorate-General for Transport and Ener-
gy (DG TREN) and the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX)) meet with
officials from the partner countries. From presentations of DG TREN and the EU’s second
strategic energy review one can deduce that the EU is very interested in becoming more
active in securing energy supplies from the East (a task certain member states prefer to
care for themselves). This translates into three EU core objectives of the Energy Security
16
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Platform: (1) Enhancing framework conditions and solidarity, (2) Support for infrastructure
development, interconnection and diversification of supply and (3) Harmonisation of en-
ergy policies. For all main objectives, different sub-goals have been defined:
1. Enhancing framework conditions and solidarity
− Development and implementation of mutual energy support and security mechanisms,
including early warning mechanisms and joint security actions;
− Strengthening of energy security contacts and enhancement of energy crisis prepared-
ness by establishing an energy security panel;
− Development of an Energy Infrastructure Action Plan based on corresponding EU
positions.
2. Support for infrastructure development, interconnection and diversification of
supply
− Support for the rehabilitation of the gas transit network (for example through inter-
national investment conferences);
− Create a level playing-field for energy transits;
− Multinational public-private partnerships to the rehabilitation of gas transit networks;
− Enhancement of political and practical support for the realisation of the Southern
energy corridor;
− Support of the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline;
− Mobilisation of additional technical assistance and loans from EIB (and other Inter-
national Financial Institutions), notably through the NIF (Neighbourhood Investment
Facility), e.g. to increase partners’ gas, oil and oil products storage capacities, hydro-
carbon processing and transportation infrastructures, and to upgrade electricity inter-
connections;
− Support for the acceleration of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s accession to the UCTE (Union
for the Co-ordination of the Transmission of Electricity) network;
− Promotion of the development of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities at Black Sea.
3. Harmonisation of energy policies
− Organisation of seminars, workshops and training sessions on the EU energy acquis;
− Twinning and networking between EU and partner countries energy institutions;
− Development of an energy dialogue with participation of EU and partners’ industry.
While certain of the EU objectives are not shared by all EU member states, others are un-
disputed and could provide mutually beneficial fields for cooperation between the EU and
the Eastern partners (see section 4). However, some of the EU objectives concerning en-
ergy transit are not in the interest of all partner countries. Thus, it is for example unclear
what role Belarus would play in a platform discussion about the support to Ukraine’s UCTE
accession or the Southern Energy Corridor as those initiatives are clearly against the in-
terest of the Belarus energy sector. The same holds true on Ukraine’s incentives to strength-
en the natural gas transit through Belarus.
Consequently, it is not clear whether this EU “wish-list” could become the basis for a fruit-
ful multilateral discussion. Thus, the success of the platform depends both, on the willing-
ness of all partners to collaborate, the possibility to focus on common objectives and the
ability to find tailor-made solutions for each partner country that fit in a common frame-
work.
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The “Regional electricity markets, improved energy efficiency and increased use of renew-
able energy sources” Flagship contains energy related fields for setting up a visible joint
project. According to DG TREN the objectives are to either support the extension of inter-
connections and/or to improve energy efficiency and expand use of renewable resources.
DG RELEX identifies four main elements for the energy flagship:
− Technical assistance for studies/expertises in matters of regulatory and policy frame-
work, capacity building and occasional (small scale) pilot project financing;
− Feasibility studies and other activities to improve access to available financing sources
for investment in the energy sector;
− Support the establishment and implementation of “sustainable energy action plans”
by cities having signed up for the “Covenant of Mayors”;
− Promote the participation of Eastern Partnership countries in the Intelligent Energy
Europe Programme.
As indicated in Section 2 the drawback of the described high-aiming objectives of the Eastern
Partnership is their funding. At best, the Belarus energy sector might expect some EUR 20
m annually (potentially less as equally distributing EUR 600 m over four years, six coun-
tries and five policy fields is EUR 5 m per country, year and subject and assuming that
Belarus could only benefit from the EUR 150 m for the flagship and the platform the an-
nual contribution of the Eastern Partnership might be around EUR 1 m for Belarus energy
issues). This is not the appropriate dimension for effective financial assistance in the en-
ergy sector. Consequently, the Eastern Partnership funding might only act as a catalyst
helping to provide the framework conditions for loans from international financial institu-
tions and bilateral agencies.
At first glance, the highly human capital intensive multilateral expert rounds installed via
the Eastern Partnership might thus not be very attractive to Belarus policy makers in par-
ticular as they do not guarantee a direct payoff in terms of EU financial assistance. Such
thinking would, however, be short-sighted. We see three major motives why Belarus should
become seriously engaged in the Eastern Partnership: (1) to increase the acceptability of
any kind of international cooperation with Belarus, (2) to increase the ability of Belarus to
attract and conduct major projects and (3) to increase the chances of a growing EU bud-
get allocation towards technical and financial assistance to Belarus.
(1) Increasing acceptability of any kind of international cooperation with Belarus
By demonstrating the willingness and ability to successfully conduct smaller projects in the
framework of the Eastern Partnership Belarus sends a strong signal to the EU and other
western donors. Already in the short and mid-term when the EBRD decides about its country
strategy (the EU and the member states are in the executive board of the EBRD), the EU
prepares its 2014–2020 budget and other IFIs (e.g. KfW) reconsider their level of activity
in Belarus, the preparedness of Belarus to meet EU project standards and follow correspond-
ing procedures will be an important argument.
(2) Increasing the ability of Belarus to attract and conduct major projects
Smaller multilateral projects and expert talks are a good way to familiarise Belarus experts
and officials with the functioning of EU project procedures. Furthermore, increased direct
contact will help Belarus officials to learn the objectives and constraints of EU-politics, which
will be highly beneficial when drafting future proposals for major projects.
(3) Increasing the chances of a growing EU budget allocation towards technical
and financial assistance to Belarus.
The decisions on EU funding are not only made based on the potential outcomes but they
are also related to past successes/failures. Consequently, the EU monitors closely the de-
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velopment of past/ongoing projects when deciding about new ones.22  Funding for the East-
ern Partnership from 2011 to 2013 is for example linked to the mid-term review of the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument which is due in March 2010.23  More
importantly, the negotiations on the next EU budget for 2014–2020 will probably begin as
soon as the new Commission is in place (end of 2009). There, important decisions on the
scale of funding for the Eastern Partnership and other instruments of technical and finan-
cial assistance will have to be made. In this context it will be essential for Belarus, as for
other countries, to play an active role in this budget development process (i.e., lobby for
Belarus interest). To do so, the corresponding (formal and informal) procedures need to be
known, the pivotal institutions and persons need to be identified and good contacts should
be established. Thus, Eastern Partnership provides invaluable insight into the complex
Brussels cosmos.
The means by which Belarus could increase its benefits from cooperation are outlined in the
next section.
2.4. Increasing the benefits from cooperation
Belarus has the political will, the appropriate projects and the technical capacity to attract
more energy sector projects for the mutual benefit of Eastern Partners, the EU and Belarus.
Nevertheless it could not be taken for granted that the Eastern Partnership will bring a
breakthrough with respect to foreign financial and technical assistance to the energy sec-
tor. One important reason is that Belarus’ has no sufficiently professionalized system of
assistance acquisition. To rectify this situation we suggest that Belarus strengthen its abilities
to successfully interact with potential donors and deliver strong proposal (Institutional
Component), and that a limited number of highly appropriate, internally coordinated, well-
founded projects are identified (Project Identification Component).
Institutional Component
Attracting technical and financial assistance is like attracting investments or selling goods
not only depending on the technical characteristics of the product. Consequently, also as-
sistance projects require appropriate marketing. General recommendations are building
trust-relationships with the potential “buyers” (i.e., EU officials) to reduce transaction cost
or transparently providing the information required by the buyer and thereby reduce cost-
ly frictions from information asymmetries. In more specific terms the suggestion we con-
sider most important is to employ specialised experts. In the short term this would require
the collaboration with expensive, though cost-effective, external experts. In the long term
educating internal experts for the project acquisition processes is essential. Taking into
account the potential resources at stake, those should form a competitively paid team of
aptly educated and English speaking experts. In its “Action fiche for Belarus 2009” the EU
acknowledges frankly: “the vast majority of Belarusian institutions have limited if no knowl-
edge of the requirements for successful implementation of EC assistance programmes has
been attributed to the political isolation the country has been in with regards to the EU. The
21 “Finalisation of a European Commission- Belarus declaration on energy, as a basis for further develop-
ment of energy cooperation. This cooperation could cover, inter alia, hydrocarbon transit and energy sector
reforms”. Eastern Partnership, 3.12.2008, COM (2008) 823 final.
“The Eastern Partnership aims to strengthen energy security through cooperation with regard to long-
term stable and secure energy supply and transit, including through better regulation, energy efficien-
cy and more use of renewable energy sources. Provisions on energy interdependence could be included
in the new Association Agreements or other bilateral arrangements between the EU and the partner coun-
tries. Energy cooperation should take into account the EU’s Second Strategic Energy Review and each
partner country’s energy policy.” (Prague Declaration).
22 This is efficient in economic terms as trust is an appropriate tool to reduce transaction cost.
23 UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee.
GERMAN ECONOMIC TEAM IN BELARUSIPM RESEARCH CENTER
19
intensified technical cooperation between the European Commission and Belarus has giv-
en rise to the need to strengthen the institutions responsible for the implementation of sector
programmes of mutual interest – and specifically the ones targeted by the ENP Annual Action
Programmes.” Consequently the EU has explicitly entered in the food safety programme the
objective of a “Strengthened National Coordination Unit to effectively coordinate the im-
plementation of the programmes under ENPI and to deal with identification and program-
ming issues.”24  Currently, the installation of the National Coordinating Unit (NCU) is sup-
ported by the EU with a EUR 600,000 project.25  The objective of this project is to support
the capacity of Belarus to make the best use of EC assistance.26  The existing efforts to build
up a powerful competence centre as a joint resource for all Ministries should not only be
pursued but need to be strengthened financially, administratively and human capital wise.
In addition to this explicit capacity building the possibilities of an effective learning-on-the-
job should be enhanced. That is, the same group of people should be involved in as many
proposals as possible.
Project Identification Component
For attracting investments it is not sufficient to just present a large list of potential projects
without clear priorities originally designed to be internally financed. Suggesting a limited
number of highly appropriate internally coordinated projects that provide clear value add-
ed to all partners is much more promising. Thereby, it is important to draft the proposal
from the “buyer” perspective. That is, more emphasis should be devoted to highlight the
advantages for the EU than on presenting why the project fits well into Belarus plans. This
is crucial because the EU is no monolith organisation but an institution with diverging in-
terests. Thus, providing good arguments to those EU units/officials who support Belarus
efforts is essential so that they have the tools to convince their more reluctant colleagues.
Projects of mutual interest were already identified by the EU (especially DG TREN appears
to be rather active). In the field of technical cooperation security of supply agreements
on natural gas, oil and electricity seem to be high on the agenda. This might for example
consist of formalized mutual help in case of disruptions. In case of uneven risks and ben-
efits such cooperation agreement might well contain a financial component. It is for example
thinkable that the usage of security of supply infrastructure (e.g., pipelines and storage
facilities) in one country is allowed to another country under certain circumstances. In case
of a natural gas supply disruption Belarus might for example allow Poland to use gas from
Belarus’ natural gas storage facilities. Such a formalized “insurance” contract might well be
coupled to the annual payment of an insurance payment. Concerning financial assistance,
joint infrastructure projects to increase the technical security of supply come to mind.
Enhancing the reliability of natural gas, oil and electricity infrastructure is in the shared
interest of the energy importing EU and its energy transiting neighbours. Concrete proposals
in the framework of a multilateral proposal have of course to be cross checked with respect
to potentially competing interests among the partner countries (e.g., it would be natural
to assume a competition between Belarus and Ukraine for natural gas transit volumes).
24 Action fiche for Belarus 2009 – support to quality infrastructure in Belarus – food safety.
25 Within the framework of the TACIS Action Programme 2005-2006 provision was made to support the
National Coordination Unit in Belarus. The contract was signed on 05 May 2008 and the project activi-
ties in Belarus started on 12 May 2008.
26 The project Terms of Reference specify four specific objectives:
1. Promote the long-term self-sustainability of the NCU.
2. Assist the Belarus government to participate in the Neighbourhood Policy Instruments.
3. Strengthen the capacity in relation to EU external assistance programmes.
4. Increase public awareness of EC assistance programmes.
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3. Belarusian Infrastructure Policies in 2009
Belarus’ economic system can be characterized as a government-controlled economy with
private ownership in some sectors. The infrastructure sector is almost entirely in state
ownership with only little, strongly regulated, private participation in telecommunication
(mobile) and transportation (street transport).
Up until now, the Belarusian economy did not suffer much from the economic crisis. IMF
loans helped to maintain currency reserves and the government again postponed privati-
sation due to underrated asset prices during the crisis. Although there have been some
reforms in economic policy (concerning improving business climate), Belarus has seen al-
most no reforms in the infrastructure sector. Instead, tariffs in some sectors (e.g. electric-
ity) have been kept at artificially low levels to contain inflation. Extensively discussed
ownership reforms in infrastructure industries have still not been implemented. However,
there are plans to start corporatisation and privatisation (mainly in railways and telecom-
munications). Nevertheless, the lack of competition, overregulation, state dominance,
numerous distortions, weak incentives and insufficient investment still remain main char-
acteristics of the sectors.
The corresponding lack of proper incentives and foreign investments partly explains the de-
creasing performance of the infrastructure industry. Especially the lack of investments
exacerbates the current difficulties of the Belarusian economy, namely negative trade and
payment balances. Nevertheless, market oriented structural reforms in industries and in-
frastructure are no priority for the government. Despite a presumed need of foreign invest-
ment in 2010, we do not expect further restructuring and privatisation to be realized in 2010
due to the time-consuming governmental procedures of discussion and approvals.
Reforms in the transport sector remained inconsecutive. No attempts were made to re-
form Belarusian Railways, a monopolistic railway operator and service provider, or public
street transportation companies. However, there are ongoing discussions on the necessity
to reorganize Belarusian Railways into a state-owned joint-stock company and separate the
social infrastructure. Besides, some entities of Belarusian Railways are set to be privatized
in 2010. Cross-subsidisation between local and international freights was reduced in 2009,
while cross-subsidies between passenger and freight transportation increased. Until now,
the automobile transportation is more open to competition compared to the railway trans-
portation, though state-owned providers of road transportation services generally receive
more favourable treatment than their private competitors.
Although the government takes some steps to bring to telecommunication sector clos-
er towards international standards (WTO in particular) by, for example, selling shares of
mobile operators to foreign owners in previous years, real competition in the sector remains
underdeveloped. Long awaited changes to the legislation regulating the telecommunication
market, were not realized. Thus, there are no clear plans for real liberalisation and priva-
tisation of the sector including the national operator Beltelecom. Thus, the monopolistic
nature of the sector will persist.
The energy sector (both natural gas and electricity) does not show noticeable progress
in implementing market reforms. Current consumption of imported natural gas and elec-
tricity was paid on time and in cash. External overdue debts were paid off and current debts
for energy consumption were significantly reduced. The practice of tariff setting kept be-
ing non-market while cross-subsidisation remains. The government keeps household tar-
iffs at artificially low levels. Besides, there is cross subsidisation of heat by electricity. As a
result, most industrial consumers face high electricity tariffs which hurt their competitive-
ness. The generally low end user energy prices affected the financial results of the energy
enterprises, thus restraining investment in new equipment and technologies. The govern-
ment does not see restructuring per se as a mechanism for improving efficiency. It thus does
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not seems to be ready yet for comprehensive reforms. Privatisation and the set up of an
independent regulatory organ in the sector are not in the discussion.
There are only minor differences between the EBRD and the IPM Research Center indices
(Figure 3). Due to a finer scaling used by the IPM Research Center the indices of reforms
in railway and electricity sectors are higher than those of EBRD, while reforms in the road
sector are slightly lower. Both EBRD and the IPM Research Center experts did not find much
progress in implementing reforms in any sector of the Belarusian infrastructure.
Figure 3:
Infrastructure reform indices for Belarus
Sources: EBRD (2009). Transition in Crisis? Transition report 2009; EBRD (2008). Growth in Transi-
tion. Transition report 2008; IPM RC estimates.
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Figure 4:
Railway transportation intensity
Source: own calculations based on data of Belstat.
3.1. Railways
3.1.1. Progress in 2009
Belarusian Railways (BR) is a sole operator and provider of transport services in the rail-
way sector. Despite intense discussions on the necessity to reform BR’s business structure
nothing significant was done in 2009. Among the discussed reforms were privatisation of
the non-core business units of BR (assets that are neither railways nor carriages), transi-
tion of social infrastructure from BR to local authorities as well as the creation of a joint
venture with Russian Railways. Nowadays, the structure of BR, besides 47 enterprises and
7 plants, includes 38 institutions, among them are healthcare, education and cultural in-
stitutions as well as some sport units. As a positive sign one may consider the inclusion of
5 more enterprises of BR (on top of the initial 4) into the list of enterprises to be privatised
in 2010. However, there is not much hope that the plan on privatisation will be implemented.
Among other developments one should mention the creation of a logistic centre in Brest
in the form of a joint venture with the private Czech railways operator OKD Doprava1  and
the development of container transportation, that includes among others the Brest–Kaluga-
Brest railway connection (transporting spare parts to plants of Peugeot-Citroen and VW),
the ZUBR train (connecting Estonia, Latvia, Belarus) and the Viking train (connecting Lithua-
nia, Belarus, Ukraine).
Despite these efforts the freight traffic of BR dropped by 12.9% in 2009. Most of this de-
cline occurred due to the global economic crisis. Since the first half of 2009 (when the fall
was 18.1% yoy) the sector has seen a slight increase of fright transportation volumes.
Another negative factor was a reorientation of transport flows from Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia to China as well as to ports of the Russian Federation instead of the ports of Baltic coun-
tries. As the GDP in Belarus remained almost unchanged in real terms (growth 0.2% yoy)
in 2009, it implies that the intensity of freight transportation fell by 12.9%, making 2009
the sixth consecutive year of falling intensity (see Figure 4). The railway transportation is
losing its attractiveness compared to the auto transportation and the status quo can only
be maintained by improving logistic services in the railway sector.
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1 The initiative comes from OKD Doprava that owns the terminal in Brest on the basis of which the cen-
tre is going to be created.
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Tariff policy became the main instrument of reaction to the challenges of the global eco-
nomic crisis by BR. In 2009, tariffs grew by 58.8% yoy (see Table 2). However, there was
a wide range of discounts for more than 80 product categories in international transporta-
tion, especially transported from Kaliningrad. Domestic transportation tariffs were raised
by 10% in March and again in June 2009, in order to make domestic transportation prof-
itable and to eliminate cross-subsidies between domestic and international freights. As a
result, 92% of the expenditures (around 70% in previous years) were covered by the tar-
iffs in 2009, while it is expected that all expenditures will be covered by the tariffs in 2010.
It is quite possible that this target is going to be achieved, as freight tariffs have already
grown twice in 2010 by 15% and 5%.
The volume of passenger traffic continued to decline in 2009. It decreased by 9.8% yoy and
its intensity by 8.3% (Figure 4). There are numerous factors that caused this decline. Be-
sides the ongoing automobilisation of the country and decreasing mobility of the popula-
tion, the global financial crisis affected the passenger transportation greatly, as it reduced
the number of cross-border trips. Another factor, affecting the volume of international rail-
road passengers is growing tariffs which increased by 25.3% yoy in 2009 exceeding both
the consumer and service price index. Whereas the tariffs for suburban and national pas-
senger transportation remained almost unchanged. Tariffs for national passenger transpor-
tation grew by 0.3% yoy but fell for suburban transportation by 3.2% which was caused
by the new scheme of tariff-setting for these services. At present, ticket prices purely de-
pend on the distance travelled, compared to the number of zones travelled as it was done
before. 2009 was the second consecutive year, in which tariffs for national and suburban
transportation were not rising. The increase of the general price level leads to mounting
losses of BR in the passenger segment, which are partly compensated via increasing cross-
subsidisations between passenger and freight transportation. Additionally, growing tariffs
for international passenger transportation increase the cross-subsidies of international
against domestic passenger transportation.
The global economic crisis hampered the overall conditions for railway operations in 2009.2
For the first time since 2000 the share of passenger transportation in total railway trans-
portation grew from 14.3% to 14.7% (Figure 5). The traffic density on the other hand fell
by 12.4% to 11.6 m units per km, which is still a good level compared to other CEE and
CIS countries.3  Such developments mean a growing need for cross-subsidisation on the one
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Freight transportation 227.5 120.5 119.8 112.7 107.1 113.5 115.5 124.9 158.8 
Passenger transportation          
International 183.7 140.2 132.4 151.5 112.1 117.3 128.6 123.6 125.3 
National 251.4 197.4 141.7 117.0 109.5 111.3 113.3 100.0 100.3 
Suburban 269.2 202.9 162.0 134.8 120.0 120.4 117.9 100.0 96.8 
Consumer price index 161.1 142.6 128.4 118.1 110.3 107.0 108.4 114.8 112.9 
Service price index 216.8 193.4 161.9 121.2 112.0 113.2 108.8 118.2 113.9 
 
Table 2:
Price indices of railway transportation services, yoy
Source: Belstat.
2 These conditions can be evaluated by traffic mix proportion of passengers and traffic density Traffic mix
characterizes the share of passenger traffic in total traffic (sum of passenger and freight traffics). Traf-
fic density is a ratio of total traffic per 1km of railroads.
3 For international comparison see Amos, P. (2005). Reform, Commercialisation and Private Sector Par-
ticipation in Railways in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The World Bank Group Transport paper #4, p.
2. The highest traffic density is in Russia (19.4 m units per km m units per km), while Belarus holds the
second place. The traffic mix ratio in Russia, for instance, is 9% (21% in Ukraine).
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Figure 5:
Trends in railway transportation environment
Source: own calculations based on data of Belstat.
hand and higher fixed costs related to maintenance and operation of the railway network
on the other. As a result, BR needs timely reforms to sustain the consequences of the glo-
bal economic crisis, the changing transportation flow patterns and the declining public fi-
nancing.
3.1.2. Reform agenda
The most discussed problem faced by railways is the abolishment of cross-subsidisation
between passenger and freight transportation, which causes losses for BR. This can be
achieved by forcing passengers to cover a greater share of costs while providing the most
sensitive (to an increase in railway tariffs) part of population with direct income compen-
sation.
Another important reform issue is the abolishment of all non-core activities and split up of
core activities into separate lines of business. The process seems to be ready to start, as 9
enterprises under the BR conglomerate are listed to be privatized in 2010. However, for a
lack of actual deals, it is quite possible that this part of the reform will remain unaccom-
plished. Further reforms should thus be carried out in the following steps:
− The government should create a clear regulatory framework by separating the eco-
nomic activities of the railway sector from its regulation. An independent regulator for
this sector would ensure that investment and other decisions are not influenced by
the concerted interests of consumers of transportation services or by railway construc-
tion companies. Later on it could also regulate access to the market of private carri-
ers and forwarding companies. A transparent tariff setting policy, which would not be
influenced by Belarusian Railways, should be the responsibility of the regulator;
− Finally, the core economic activities in this sector should be divided into separate
companies. Initially, these companies should be separately incorporated and jointly
integrated into a holding structure. Privatisation of the separate companies can oc-
cur after a suitable regulatory framework is established.
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3.2. Roads
3.2.1. Progress in 2009
The situation in the road sector remained largely unchanged in 2009 compared to the pre-
vious year, with shrinking financing of the road infrastructure remaining the most acute and
troublesome problem. This process has accelerated since 2007, when the special turnover
tax on road usage was abolished. The government did not find a possibility to reallocate
funds in the general government budget to meet demand of the road infrastructure, espe-
cially in 2009.The economic crisis, the necessity to attract IMF loans and to reduce foreign
trade deficit forced government to cut public expenditures by 3% of GDP and to run a gen-
eral government budget of no more than 0.7% of GDP. As a result the road fund – main
source of financing for road programs – accumulated BYR 1974.5 bn or 1.4% of GDP which
is 0.9 percentage points less than in 2005, when the fund reached its maximum volume,
and 0.1 percentage points less than in 2008. Additional sources of finance for the road sector
are expected to be attracted by borrowings from banks and international organisations. For
example, Belarus is negotiating an agreement with the World Bank on a loan of USD 150
m for the Minsk-Gomel road reconstruction program. The situation is worsened by the fact
that road fund resources of around BYR 400 bn have been annually spent on non-core
activities, such as agricultural programs4. In 2010, expenditures in the road sector will be
financed directly from the local government budgets and the total sum is reduced by the
BYR 400 bn mentioned above. As a result, in 2010 only 120 km (of a total of 15,000 km)
of roads are planned to be repaired.
In 2009, the freight transportation sector continued to suffer from external shocks. The
global economic crisis, accompanied by declining external trade, led to a reduction of road
freight transportation in Belarus by 2.2% (intensity5  by 2.4%). To some degree the reduction
of international road freights, which are most exposed to the volatility of the world econ-
omy, was compensated by increased transportation on the domestic market. The volume
of the freight transported even slightly grew by 0.3% in 2009, showing that the general
reduction was due to the distance factor. The freight tariffs grew by 9.8% in 2009, increasing
the advantages of the auto transport sector against the railway sector, that suffered a much
faster tariff growth. In addition, the sector benefited from tax liberalisation, especially the
abolishment of the turnover taxes.
The main event in the sector was actually the announcement of the creation of a new cus-
toms union with Kazakhstan and Russia. The outcomes of such a union for the Belarusian
freight transportation sector can be hardly predicted. However, there should not be a sig-
nificant increase of trade among these countries, as there are almost no import duties levied
on intra-CIS trade. Besides, import tariffs in Belarus and Russia are almost fully (98%)
harmonised even without the union. The most obvious advantage that Belarus could gain
from a union is an increase in transit through its territory. The volume of goods imported
to Russia via Belarus would be growing because Belarus’ customs service allows electron-
ic declarations and is faster and more flexible than the Russian one. This growth is expected
despite the widespread practice of obligatory convoy, disproportionately high fines for mi-
nor violations of the customs rules. However, Belarusian transport firms will not gain much
from this increase, as their possibility to operate in the Russian market depends on the
number of licences issued for Belarusian companies. Russia is obviously not interested in
raising this amount, while Belarus claims that single customs territory means full access
of transport firms from Belarus to the Russian market. Besides, this approach will in per-
spective grant Belarus access to the Chinese market, as only transport firms from neigh-
bouring countries are allowed to service freight transportation in China.
4 http://news.belta.by/ru/actual/interview?id=540070.
5 Intensity is measured as a ratio of freight transportation in tone-km to GDP in real terms.
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Freight transportation 163.6 137.2 138.4 125.8 111.6 108.7 110.7 114.0 110.0 
Passenger transportation          
suburban 172.5 213.7 151.0 150.4 123.3 119.6 113.3 104.6 122.0 
interurban bus 168.5 175.3 136.7 135.9 126.2 113.5 113.2 104.6 114.6 
Consumer price index 161.1 142.6 128.4 118.1 110.3 107.0 108.4 114.8 112.9 
Service price index 216.8 193.4 161.9 121.2 112.0 113.2 108.8 106.9 113.9 
 
Due to legal and regulatory barriers as well as unfair competition from state companies
private passenger transportation sector remain underdeveloped. The most controversial
issue is the status of the passenger transportation operator that should mediate between
contractors (local authorities) and carriers. The state carriers are usually functioning also
as operators, thus enjoying privileges over private carriers. Besides, as there are no instruc-
tions on the procedure of the implementation of the contract between the operator and the
private carrier, the functions of control and levying fines are exercised by the operator, who
in practice is also a rival of the private carrier. As a positive development in the sector one
may consider the reduction of the tax burden. In 2009, the tax rate for carriers operating
within the simplified taxation system was reduced from 8% to 5–6% of the revenue. How-
ever, the presence of the numerous barriers and the economic crisis caused a reduction of
the passenger transportation volume of private carriers by further 28.2% yoy in 20096.
Private carriers accounted only for 3.8% of all passenger traffic (compared to 9.2% in 2007).
The overall passenger traffic and its intensity fell by 7.7% and 5.8% yoy respectively (see
Figure 6). The fall of the number of passengers transported is less significant (2.4% yoy)
indicating an over-proportionate reduction in long-distance journeys. The decline in pas-
senger transportation was caused both by the global economic crisis and increased tariffs.
Suburban and intercity tariffs increased by 22.0% and 14.6% yoy respectively, which is
much higher than the overall inflation level in Belarus (see Table 3).
Figure 6:
Auto transportation intensity
Source: own calculations based on data of Belstat.
Table 3:
Price indices of auto transportation services, yoy
Source: Belstat.
6 The data represents the passenger transportation volume only of individual entrepreneurs. In 2009 the
fall was 54.8% due to the new legislation regulating individual entrepreneurship (see Belarus Infrastruc-
ture Monitoring 2009).
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As a result auto transportation suffered growing losses in 2009, 4.8% compared to 3.3%
in 2008 proving the inefficiency of the sector and the need for reforms.
3.2.2. Reform agenda
Sustainable development of the road network requires an improvement of financing of road
construction and maintenance. By abandoning to finance activities not related to the road
industry from the road fund (and saving this sources for the road sector) additional finan-
cial scope could be gained. The natural monopoly operator Belavtodor should be given more
independence from the Ministry of Transport to ensure that decisions on financing road
construction and maintenance are less influenced by the transport lobby.
High import taxes on vehicles hamper competitiveness of Belarusian carriers compared to
railways and carriers of other countries. To make competition fairer, it is necessary to low-
er taxes on imported trucks. The customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan is not going
to solve the problem as the mutual tariffs are being set equal to the ones implemented in
Belarus. However, this action will not help MAZ as its main rival is KAMAZ rather than trucks
imported from the rest of the world. The other acute problem of a high tax burden on freight
carriers has been mitigated, however, by recent simplifications in taxation, including the
abolishment of agricultural levies. At the same time it is equally important to start the
restructuring and privatisation of state-owned truck companies.
The government has to ensure equal treatment of private providers and public companies
(including the same requirements for the technical characteristics of vehicles, the use of
cash registers, equal access to routes etc) in order to maintain an urban passenger trans-
portation market. The roles of contractors and operators of transportation services should
be seperated by legislation. The right to operate in the market should not be granted to
companies providing transportation services. Instead, a regulatory body should be estab-
lished – independent both from state administration and service providers. Furthermore,
the sources of finance of the operator should be clearly defined. At present, officially the
operators service should be paid from local budgets. But, the absence of a corresponding
law encourages local authorities to levy this financial obligation on the private passenger
carriers. Besides, the trade union of “Sadruzhnast” argues that there should be changes to
the tariff setting procedure. First of all, regional councils should not be involved in regu-
lating the tariffs of private firms, which should be done by the Ministry of Economy. Sec-
ond, if enterprises are functioning under the simplified tax system – as most of the private
carriers registered in the form of individual entrepreneurs do – tariffs for their services can
not be regulated as it contradicts legislation on simplified taxation. However, transport
services happened to be exempted from this general case without much reason. Third,
“Sadruzhnast” suggests considering carriers running M2 category busses as providing trans-
port services of improved quality, which means tariffs for them should not be regulated.7
Since all public transportation companies now operate at a loss, the government needs a
strategy for their restructuring. If the losses are incurred because of government interven-
tion (rather than organisational inefficiencies) these losses should be reimbursed from the
public purse. A first step would be to sell off all freight transport vehicles and other redun-
dant assets since private sector firms provide the major part of the overall volume of ser-
vice. A considerable part of the redundant assets could be sold to private transportation
companies.
7 Stepanov V. (2010). Liberlisation… for the monopolist. Àâòîïåðåâîç÷èê (Auto carrier), N1, 2010.
30
GERMAN ECONOMIC TEAM IN BELARUSIPM RESEARCH CENTER
3.3. Telecommunications
3.3.1. Progress in 2009
There were no substantial reforms in the telecommunications sector towards liberalisation
in 2009. Main developments in the market were associated with the introduction of new
internet communication technologies, attempts of mobile telecommunication operators to
attract subscribers from competitors (due to market saturation) and increased returns from
subscribers.
The law “On Telecommunications” from 2005 remains the primary source of regulation of
the telecommunications market. Despite attempts to make amendments to the law in 2008,
aimed at the sector’s deregulation and cancellation of the monopoly of Beltelecom8, they
were not realized. The Program of Telecommunications Development in Belarus for 2006–
2010, and the State Program of Rural Sector Development for 2005–2010 (in the part
concerning telecommunications)9  have also remained unchanged. Different telecommuni-
cation technologies remain differently treated in Belarus. Beltelecom owns the external
communication channel as well as the internet infrastructure, landlines and other assets,
making independent providers to rent these from Beltelecom. On the other hand, the mobile
infrastructure is already privatized, although Beltelecom still controls cross-plugging be-
tween mobile operators.
After a single-step devaluation of the Belarusian Ruble in January 2009, telecommunica-
tions operators, like many other economic operators, strived to increase tariffs for their
services. The tariffs for telecommunication services are set in Belarusian ruble, but infra-
structure investments are performed in foreign currencies. Therefore, the devaluation pri-
marily concerned the mobile operators “Mobile TeleSystems” Joint Ltd. (MTS, brand name
“MTS”)10, FE “VELCOM” (brand names “velcom” and “PRIVET”)11, CJSC “Belarusian Telecom-
munications Network” (BTN, brand name “life:)”)12  and SP “BelCel” (brand name “diallog”13)
as they have been particularly active in infrastructure investments in the recent past. The
operators decided to increase tariffs by about 20-30% (devaluation rate). The state strived
to prevent such a price hike. The majority of mobile operators in Belarus are private com-
panies, thus, the state can involve in their price policies only by means of recommenda-
tions. Still, the state remains the majority shareholder at one of the market leaders, mo-
bile operator MTS. It forced MTS to bring tariffs back to the pre-devaluation level, which,
however, lasted only for one month when the tariffs went up again. As a result, all mobile
operators introduced several new tariff plans to increase returns from subscribers. According
to Belstat data, in 2009 tariffs for mobile communications in the country have increased
by 13.5%.
The earnings of mobile operators MTS and VELCOM in 2009 were negatively hit not only
by the devaluation, but also by market activity of the new operator BTN with the brand name
8 Beltelecom belongs to the Ministry of Communications and Informatisation and operates under its direct
supervision. Beltelecom is the “national telecommunications operator”, implementing state policies in the
sector. Beltelecom’s monopoly applies to external telecommunications as well as the distribution of in-
ternational traffic for the independent private operators.
9 Resolution of the Council of Ministries of the Republic of Belarus ¹1395, dated 23.10. 2006 “On the Rati-
fication of Program of Telecommunications Development in the Republic of Belarus for 2006–2010”. Law
of the Republic of Belarus N45-3, dated 19.07.2005 “On Telecommunication”. Edict of the President of
the Republic of Belarus N150, dated 25.03.2005 (with changes from 12.01.2007) “On the State Program
of Rural Development for 2005-2010”.
10 The amount of subscribers of MTS is 4.56 m. Owners: Beltelecom-51% and Mobile Telecystems – 49%.
11 The amount of subscribers of VELCOM is 4.1 m. Owner: SB Telecom Ltd. – 100%.
12 The amount of subscribers of BTN is 1 m. Owners: Turkcell – 80%, Beltelecom – 20%.
13 The amount of subscribers of BelCel is 132 thsd. Owners: CIB BV and Beltelecom.
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“life:)” and its low tariffs, which caused a runoff of subscribers from the “big two”. Accord-
ing to the BTN management, the company does not currently aim to break-even and can
therefore sustain losses for several more years, keeping tariffs below the market average.
As a result of such market conditions, MTS and VELCOM experienced decreases in returns
from subscribers (Average Revenue per User, ARPU), as well as a decrease in the average
mobile traffic per subscriber. The average revenue per user at MTS accounted for BYR 21.8
thsd in 2009 (compared to BYR 20.7 thsd in 2008). The average revenue per user at VEL-
COM decreased from EUR 8.2 in 2008 to EUR 5.5 in 200914.
Mobile operator MTS was active in attracting “heavy” corporate subscribers. MTS reports
that 78 out of the top-100 taxpayers in the country are its subscribers. This is not surpris-
ing, as MTS and the majority of these enterprises belong fully or partially to the state. VEL-
COM has kept another focus in its marketing policy. It remains the leader in the small- to
medium-sized corporate segment – serving around 70% of Belarusian enterprises and
organisations. According to the Ministry of Communications and Information, the number
of mobile subscribers in the country was 9.6 m in 2009. MTS has lost 6% market share —
from 52% in 2008 to 46% in 2009. The market share of velcom has decreased from 44.8%
to 42.7% in the years 2008 and 2009 respectively. The market share of BTN, on the con-
trary has considerably increased from 2.8% in 2008 to 10.3% in 2009, amounting to 1 m
subscribers.
In 2009, competition in the mobile internet has become sharper. In May 2009, VELCOM has
announced an exclusive agreement with BelCel on provision of broadband internet access
services based on the cdma2000 technology (EV-DO Rev.A). In October 2009 mobile op-
erator BTN obtained a license for the internet access technology 3G and started its com-
mercial use in November 2009. It facilitated the life:) brand recognition and attracted the
most mobile group of population as subscribers – youth and businessmen.
In 2009 mobile operators MTS and VELCOM were recognized again as monopolists in the
telecommunications sector in the State registry of monopolist enterprises. This list also
contains Beltelecom. The Resolution of the Council of Ministers N1256 from 29.09.2009
added Beltelecom to the list of enterprises subject to privatisation in 2006-2010. But the
anticipated corporatisation of Beltelecom, preceding privatisation, was not realized. Accord-
ing to the Ministry of communications and information, there is no need for the corporati-
zation of Beltelecom and attraction of strategic investors to large-scale investment projects
at the moment, as their own funds are currently sufficient. According to market experts, if
Beltelecom is going to be sold, it will be done in parts, which will mostly be its peripheral
businesses, including for example IPTV ZALA, the internet provider with the brand name
byfly15, the majority stake at MTS, the data processing centres and others. This action would
be a move towards market liberalisation, although Beltelecom would still keep its mono-
poly in providing connections to international calls as well as the internet. At the same time,
being a 100% state-owned enterprise, Beltelecom was active in 2009 in investing in the
development of different telecommunication services: IPTV ZALA, internet access technology
WiMax, Wi-Fi access points16 and increased the capacity of external gateways from 7.2 Gbps
in 2008 to 23 Gbps in 2009. The number of IPTV subscribers in 2009 totalled 70 thsd, which
is 40% higher than the projected 50 thsd subscribers.
Out of all telecommunications services, broadband internet access develops most rapidly.
The amount of broadband internet access subscribers in 2009 was 730 thsd, including the
459.4 thsd byfly’s subscribers (the amount of subscribers of byfly was 150 thsd in 2008).
14 The report of VELCOM is presented in EUR.
15 The brand name of the national telecommunications operator Beltelecom in the internet connections sector.
16 In 2009 in Belarus were installed 343 Wi-Fi internet access points, 262 out of them in Minsk. The total
amount of Wi-Fi internet access points in the country 645.
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According to the survey of the Independent Institute for Socioeconomic and Political Re-
search, 41.4% of the population in Belarus or 3.99 m people had access to the internet in
2009, compared to 34.4% in 2008. Two thirds of the Belarusian internet traffic goes to
Russia, which indicates the weak development of internet-based services in Belarus.
In April 2009, Beltelecom decreased tariffs for internet access for independent secondary
providers (Beltelecom is the primary provider) by 25%. This decrease in tariffs was wel-
comed by providers, which still heavily depend on the monopolist Beltelecom in their pric-
ing policies. Beltelecom decreased its tariffs for internet access for end-users under the
brand name byfly more intensively, than for independent providers, thus threatening the
loss of subscribers and posing risks for their investment programs. At the same time, Beltele-
com’s revenue from internet access services increased from 0.5% of the total Beltelecom’s
revenue in 2006 to 17% in 2009, becoming an important source of Beltelecom’s profits.
According to Beltelecom’s representatives, its investments in 2010 will go to the develop-
ment of networks, further introduction of digital commutation systems, development of rural
telephone networks, including those in agro-towns, development of wireless WLL technol-
ogies, increase of Wi-Fi internet connection points, development of auxiliary high-quality
telecommunications services and the development of the WiMax technology. The sources
of Beltelecom’s investments also come from the fund of the universal maintenance, creat-
ed in 2007. The means for this fund are obligatory payments of telecommunication oper-
ators in the amount of 1.5% of the revenues received from providing telecommunication
services.
Within the framework of the State Program of Telecommunication Sector Development, 220
thsd phones were introduced to local networks in 2009, including 120 thsd at urban tele-
phone exchanges (out of them 70 thsd based on WLL technology). The density of landline
phones per hundred persons has risen to 41 in 2009 (40.4 in 2008).
In 2009, tariffs for local connections in Belarus increased by 7.2% and for international
connections by 0.4%. Such an increase in tariffs has not surpassed the inflation rate in the
counry (CPI=13%), though. It indicates the absence of any considerable decrease in cross-
subsidies in the sector (see Figure 7). Still, prices for international connections grow slower
than for local connections, thus indicating a positive tendency in the elimination of cross-
subsidies.
Figure 7:
Annual Growth of Telephone Communication Tariffs for Households and CPI (in %, 2001–2009)
Source: Belstat.
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The profitability of the telecommunication sector decreased in 2009. The net profit of tele-
communication organisations accounted for BYR 828.1 bln, which is 29.2% less than in
2008. The rate of return decreased from 37.8% in 2008 to 32.3% in 2009 (Table 4). The
decrease in profits was associated with the international financial crisis and decreased
purchasing power of the population and increased costs (investments in the development
of infrastructure).
Table 4:
Profitability of telecommunications services (in %, 2003–2009)
Source: Belstat.
Thus, in 2009 as in previous years the telecommunication sector in Belarus remained highly
monopolized. The basic telecommunication services were provided at tariffs below cost and
thus cross-subsidisation remained. Beltelecom’s monopoly hindered the development of
competition in the market and introduction of innovative services at low cost.
The main characteristics of the telecommunications sector in 2009 were:
− persisting social orientation in the government’s policy in the sector and cross-sub-
sidies;
− absence of awaited reforms of legislation, regulation of telecommunications;
− intense competition between mobile operators for existing subscribers due to the
decrease in the purchasing power after the international financial crisis;
− investments in new telecommunication technologies, in particularly those in internet
connections, IPTV, increase in quality and spectrum of telecommunication services;
− gradual decrease in tariffs for internet connections;
− preservation of exaggerated tariffs for innovative telecommunications services and
international calls.
3.3.2. Reform agenda
There were no regulatory changes in the telecommunications sector in 2009. As a result,
our policy recommendations remain the same. Active government interference in the de-
cision making at the micro and macro level constraints development in the sector. Chang-
es should focus on the creation of a competitive and attractive investment environment.
In this regard, the following telecommunication sector reforms are important:
− Monetisation of benefits for separate population groups. Social benefits should be
provided in the form of direct money compensations.
− Abolishment of cross-subsidisations of local connections at the cost of long-distance
connections. Prices should be set at cost covering levels. This step would facilitate
competition, lower tariffs for long-distance calls, increase attraction for investments,
bring conformity to international norms in telecommunications regulation and facili-
tate integration of the country in the world’s telecommunications market.
− Pursuing profitability and operational efficiency in the telecommunications sector.
Companies should provide social benefits only if these are directly compensated from
the state budget.
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Telecommunications  
sector 13.5 26.9 37.5 45.1 40.4 37.8 32.3 
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− Removal of the monopoly on the delivery of long-distance and international calls as
well as IP-telephony services. Access of private companies to these segments will
foster price competition and ensure a dynamic development of the fixed telephony
sector.
− Privatisation of Beltelecom in order to remove the state’s monopoly in the sector. This
step will provide transparency of its activity and will increase management motiva-
tion and efficiency within the sector.
− Creation of an independent regulator in the telecommunication sector shielding market
participants from political interventions in order to ensure long-term market stabili-
ty and a level playing field. The regulator should also ensure market discipline while
protecting consumer interests and facilitating open access to the core infrastructure
of the network. The independence of such a body from direct political intervention has
often been cited as means of building trust among investors in a newly liberalized
sector.
3.4. Gas
3.4.1. Reforms in 2009
The natural gas sector in Belarus is dominated by the state-owned enterprise Beltopgaz,
which is managed and controlled by the Ministry of Energy of Belarus and JSC Beltransgaz.
While Beltransgaz is responsible for natural gas transportation to Belarus and managing
natural gas transit, Beltopgaz deals with the distribution and retail sales of natural gas to
final consumers inside Belarus.
During 2009 the gas sector in Belarus faced no structural changes. The agreed price increas-
es for imported natural gas were carried out and another 12.5% of Beltransgaz shares were
sold to Gazprom. The modest price growth of natural gas imports resulted in higher prices
for consumers, but did not catalyze any structural changes.
Under the contract between Beltransgaz and Gazprom for natural gas supplies and transit
from December 31, 2006, the gas price for Belarus is pegged to the average European price
and subject to a discount. In 2009 Belarus was supposed to pay 80% of the average Euro-
pean gas price minus transport costs and the export duty (30% of Gazprom’s selling price)17.
However, due to requests from Belarus, Russia reduced its rate to 70%. Besides agreements
on prices for 2007-2010, both sides agreed in the 2006 contract that Gazprom would buy
50% of Beltransgaz shares for USD 2.5 bn (solely in cash) in equal portions of 12.5% each
over a four-year period. Accordingly, in 2009 Gazprom acquired the next 12.5% of Beltrans-
gaz shares for USD 625 m, controlling 37.5%.
Among other changes in the sector, one can mention the corporatisation of 11 enterpris-
es, mainly connected with peat mining or production of equipment for peat mining. All
shares of the newly created join stock companies (JSCs) belong to the Belarusian state.
Belarusian natural gas imports in 2009 were 4.5 billion cubic meters short of the contract-
ed volume of 22.1 billion cubic meters. Belarus fell behind the gas import schedule by a
third in the first few months of 2009, when fuel oil (a reserve fuel) was burnt at Belaru-
sian CHPs to save expensive Russian gas. The government had decided to use cheaper fuel
oil instead of natural gas, thus saving USD 304 m during the heating season.
In addition European consumers reduced Russian gas consumption and transit volumes
going through Belarus fell to 44.2 billion cubic meters in 2009 from 51.2 billion cubic meters
17 in 2010 it is supposed to pay 90% of what Europeans pay and the year 2011 will see Belarus pay as much
as European consumers minus transport costs. Also, Belarus is obliged to pay in monetary assets (bar-
ter and offset schemes must be ruled out).
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in 2008. Gas transit is controlled mostly by the Russian side, and Belarusian transit reve-
nues amount to USD 400 m annually, which cannot be compared to, for example, Ukrain-
ian transit proceeds. The construction of new gas pipelines bypassing Belarus will enable
Russia to further cut “transit rents”. All attempts of the Belarusian administration to con-
vince Russia of the efficiency of the construction of a second Yamal-Europe gas pipeline in
Belarus have been unsuccessful. Until October, 2009 the price at the Beltransgaz pipeline
was USD 1.45 per tcm per 100 km and USD 0.43 at the Russian Yamal-Europe pipeline.
For the last three months of 2009 the transit fee for the Beltransgaz pipeline was increased
to USD 1.79. The Beltransgaz’s margin was also increased by USD 10.45 in October. These
increases were based on the contract signed between Belarus and Russia at the end of 2006.
In 2009 Belarus continued to buy Russian gas for relatively low prices. Because the price
of the oil basket, to which the gas price is pegged, changes on a quarterly basis, Belarus
saw natural gas prices change once in every three months (Figure 8). However, Belarus was
paying USD 150 per tcm of natural gas in 2009 which was the projected annual average
price18. The actual average price turned out to be a bit lower, at USD 148 per tcm, which
represents an increase of 16% year-on-year. As a result, Belarus was accumulating its debt
for gas during 2009; however, the USD 246 m debt reported in late 2009 was paid up be-
fore the end of the year.
Figure 8:
The development of prices for imported natural gas from Russia, 2001–2009
Note. Without VAT.
Source: The Ministry of Statistics and Analysis.
Gazprom was not paid for gas supplied from January until June 2009 – which amounted
up to USD 285 m. However, in August 2009 Beltransgaz started to pay back its debt, so
that by December 23, 2009 the entire debt was paid back (Table 5). The situation with
respect to final consumers’ payments improved also. Almost all payments (99.9%) for
natural gas were made in cash. Collection ratio for internal payments even exceeded 100%.
As a result, arrears of domestic consumers considerably slowed down. Besides such improve-
ments, there were still special and reduced prices for gas for some industrial and agricultural
enterprises, which also enjoyed delays – granted by the government – in paying back debts
of previous years (mainly agriculture).
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18 Although the verbal agreement between the two presidents enabling Belarus to pay the average price
was never officially documented as a supplementary contract.
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Table 5:
Arrears for natural gas (USD m)
Note: Data provided as of the 1
st
 January of the reported year.
Source: Belstat.
Since import prices rose only 16% year-on-year, the rise in prices for final consumers was
also moderate. Gas fees for most of Belarus’ manufacturers were raised by 9.8%: from USD
158.67 to USD 174.18 per tcm of gas (VAT not included), by January 1, 2009. Some consu-
mers (Belenergo, selected petrochemical, peat-producing and light industry companies)
continued to enjoy preferential prices, paying just between 50% and 80% of the official price.
Gas tariffs for households rose in January 1, 2010. Prices increased by 3% for households
that reside in apartments with central hot water supply and gas cookers and 20% for house-
holds in apartments without central hot water supply and gas cookers and gas water heaters.
One should point out, that in dollar terms, due to the 20% devaluation of Belarusian Ru-
ble made on January 2, 2010, tariffs for households even slightly decreased. For example,
tariffs for gas, used for heating and hot water in the heating season amounted to USD 77
(USD 80 in 2009); during summer it was USD 163 (USD 170 in 2009). Therefore, this can
be seen as proof for the increase of cross-subsidisation which remained to be a serious
problem, hurting the financial status of Beltopgaz.
3.4.2. Reform agenda
The crucial importance of natural gas to the Belarusian economy requires a stable and af-
fordable natural gas price and a secure natural gas supply. On the other hand, required
investments in infrastructure and equipment should – at least partially – be financed by
private investors. This is in particular true given the limited availability of public funds.
Inevitably rising prices for imported natural gas enhances the importance of possible costs
reduction and efficiency increases within the sector. Hence, a natural gas industry orient-
ed policy should be directed towards a sustainable, profit-oriented development whilst
providing sufficient investment incentives to the private sector.19  In this context the following
changes seem to be required:
− Tariffs for final consumers must become cost-reflective for households and for indus-
tries without allowing for cross-subsidisation. Prices for all industrial consumers should
be equal and costs should account for investment needs;
− If providing social privileges to some groups of households remains a priority of the
government, it should be dealt with in a transparent manner. Here, targeted aid or
direct income subsidisation might be considered;
− Significant and deep restructuring of Beltopgaz and Beltransgaz is needed, first of all
for finding ways to reduce costs. Both companies are overburdened with non-produc-
tive assets, and (although in part already officially corporatised) are not independent
to make financial and investment decisions. Restructuring and corporatisation also
include the necessity and the possibility to divest all ancillary enterprises not related
to the core business;
− In order to avoid cross-subsidisation between different activities within a single firm
(a particularly severe impediment for the development of competition between dif-
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Arrears of domestic 
consumers 247.51 186.05 131.03 104.30 102.30 36.0 
 
19 For more detailed suggestions for reforms in the natural gas sector see RC IPM-GET Policy Paper 15/04
Gas Sector Restructuring in Belarus: Necessity and Directions, http://www.research.by/pdf/pp2004e15.pdf.
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ferent activities), full corporatisation must include a strict legal separation (unbun-
dling) of network operations and natural gas supply (retail) activities within each
company. In case of Beltransgaz a separation of international transit and domestic
transmission is also necessary. Furthermore, in order to ensure creditworthiness, all
companies should provide a sufficient degree of transparency, e.g. through regular
independent audits according to international standards;
− In order to avoid excessive interference, the sector needs a regulator that is indepen-
dent of both the natural gas industry and the government. This body should define
the rules of the game, and consider the interests of all groups involved. Among its first
actions, the regulator should change the tariff policy for final customers which will bring
more competition into the sector.
3.5. Electricity
3.5.1. Reforms in 2009
The Belarusian power system is governed by the state enterprise Belenergo, which is ac-
countable to the Energy Ministry of Belarus. The power sector of the country consists of only
one vertically integrated company, in which generation, transmission and distribution are
not separated20.
Electrical power generation in Belarus totalled 30.1 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 2009,
a drop of 14% from 2008. Although Belarus is capable of meeting its domestic requirement
on its own, it is more profitable to import electricity during the summer. Belarusian imports
of power from Russia reached 2.908 billion kWh in 2009, an increase of 34% yoy. The
payment discipline remained strict; barter schemes have been almost liquidated (the share
of non-monetary payments amounted less then 1%). The collection ratio for internal con-
sumption exceeded 100%. Therefore, the existing arrears of the final consumers to Bele-
nergo were significantly reduced (Table 6). Also, there were still special, reduced prices for
electricity for some industrial and agricultural enterprises, which enjoyed delays – grant-
ed by the government – in paying back debts of previous years (mainly agriculture).
Table 6:
Debts from electricity consumption (USD m)
Note: Data provided as of the 1
st
 January of the reported year.
Source: Belstat.
During 2009 electrical power tariffs for all consumer groups remained stable. Taking into
account the devaluation of Belarusian Ruble, tariffs for industrial consumers decreased by
25%, in terms of USD. Households paid US 6 cents compared to 9 cents in 2008 (see Ta-
ble 7). As a result, cost coverage worsened and cross-subsidisation remained a serious issue
(industry electricity prices were still almost 50% as high as residential prices even though
the cost for distributing electricity to residential customers are generally higher).
During 2010 the Belarusian government continued its efforts to increase energy efficiency
and the use of local fuels for energy production. According to plans of the government mini-
CHP’s operating on local fuel should be installed in every district of Belarus in the coming
3-4 years. In 2009 the share of local fuel in the entire energy mix reached 21% and it is
planned that by the end of 2010 it would account for 25%. In Belarus a few mini-CHP’s
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2009 
Domestic consumers 328.62 293.92 222.52 152.48 148.2 29.7 
 
20 The system is organiser in six independent regional republican unitary enterprises (RUPs also called
oblenergos).
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Table 7:
Electricity production costs and prices for different groups of consumers (US cents per kWh)
Source: The Ministry of Energy.
working on local fuels have already been built, (in Vileika, Bobruisk, Osipovichi and other
cities). The most efficient one is the mini-CHP in Prugany (3.7 MWt), built in 2009.
 
Since 
January 
2007 
Since July 
2007  
Since 
January 
2008 
Since April 
2008 
Since 
September 
2008 
Since 
January 
2009 
Since 
January 
2010 
Cost  5.86 na 7.43 7.43 7.43 7.80 na 
Tariffs for:        
Industry with 
capacity 750 KWtA 
and more 
7.15 10.20 10.32 10.62 12.08 9.89 7.38 
Industry with 
capacity below 750 
KWtA 
9.21 10.59 10.68 11.00 12.08 12.08 9.01 
Budget financed 
organisations 7.17 10.20 10.32 10.62 12.08 12.08 9.01 
Other non-
industrial 
enterprises 
5.23 5.23 5.40 6.76 6.76 12.08 9.01 
Agriculture 4.32 5.18 7.78 8.01 8.80 8.80 9.01 
Households 9.21 10.59 10.68 11.00 12.08 8.19 6.56 
 
The Belarusian government increased annual spending aimed at saving energy. For example,
USD 1 bn was invested in energy efficiency policies in 2009 compared to USD 600 m in 2006.
According to data of the Energy Efficiency Department, financing of projects contribute to
save energy will amount up to USD 1.366 bn in 2010. As a result of these investments, 2.21
m toe would be saved. However, also the marginal costs of such policies increase. Specialists
from the Energy Efficiency Department say that during the last years all low cost options
have already been implemented. For example, in 2001 to save 1 ton of fuel one had to invest
USD 100, in 2009 for achieving the same effect one already needs to invest USD 726.
Therefore, energy saving policies will demand increasing funds from state and enterprise
budgets.
3.5.2. Reform agenda
The Belarusian electricity sector is faced with a long phase of underinvestment, low effi-
ciency and comparatively high generation costs. These challenges can only be met by strong
investment in generation, transmission and distribution capacities. According to our esti-
mates, the investments requirements until 2020 will amount to USD 20–30 bn. In the
current environment we think that neither the state budget nor Belenergo’s cash flow will
be sufficient to meet the financing needs. Consequently, private and in particular foreign
investment is needed. Foreign investors, however, will not engage unless the current reg-
ulatory environment (vertically integrated state owned monopolist Belenergo and a poor
legislative basis) is significantly altered.
The tariff policy requires substantial changes. First of all, industrial tariffs are too high (sig-
nificantly above costs) due to cross-subsidisation, privileged pricing for some industrial
consumers, debts, etc., while tariffs for households are below costs. Secondly, the policy
of eliminating cross-subsidies has been inconsistent and incomplete, and a complete elim-
ination of household cross-subsidisation has not been achieved yet. Thirdly, subsidized
energy prices for other groups, mostly industrial and agricultural enterprises remain an
important issue. Moreover, a tariff policy vis-à-vis privileged industrial enterprises remains
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unpredictable and subject to political influence. Tariff eligibility criteria are often vague,
leading to misallocation of resources, rent seeking and inconsistent information for future
planning. An overregulated tariff policy creates numerous distortions to the market, pro-
vides wrong information and incentives to customers (i.e. reducing motivation to save
energy) and decreases investment funds of energy companies.
It is worth to mention, that inevitable price increases for imported Russian natural gas
requires urgent measures to prevent sharply escalating electricity costs and tariffs. Mod-
ernizing some of the power plants in order to use domestic and renewable energy sources
is useful, but can only provide a partial solution. A nuclear power station (if a decision for
building it is made) will not be active before 2016.
As it was already mentioned, the Belarusian electricity sector operates inefficiently with large
deferred investments. The following measures are needed to enable the electricity sector
to provide the desired outcomes:
− Tariffs should be set at cost-reflecting and equal levels for all consumers without any
price privileges or cross-subsidisation;
− If providing social privileges to some groups of households remains a priority of the
government, it should be dealt with in a transparent manner with the help of target-
ed aid or better via direct income subsidisation;
− Gradual implementation of a tariff differentiation schemes could be very useful. Al-
ready a 5% reduction in peak load, could provide essential savings on fuel and ca-
pacity costs. Furthermore, these schemes would contribute additional benefits, includ-
ing the reduction of ancillary services costs, spending on transmission system exten-
sions and CO2 emissions, as well as a rise in electricity consumption awareness that
induces additional electricity savings and assuring a constant load for the intended
nuclear power plant and renewables in off-peak periods.21
− An independent regulator creating incentives for cost cutting should be established.
The system should be transformed from a centrally planned into a self-developing
market, where the state only guarantees that no single market actor or the state it-
self abuse market power;
− The policy of further and stricter budget constraints for consumers should be contin-
ued. It is therefore reasonable to permit non-paying consumers, including public util-
ities etc., to be disconnected;
− Guaranteed third party access to the transport and distribution networks should be
gradually opened on a clear non-discriminatory basis;
− Corporatisation and restructuring of all regional branches of Belenergo (oblenergos)
and of all ancillary businesses should step by step start. The best results with respect
to efficiency improvements, investments and privatisation revenues can only be at-
tained by a full scale restructuring. This should be implemented on a step by step basis,
but in a consistent and decisive manner.22
Once these steps have been taken, the government will be in a position to address the next
important issue: increase efficiency within the sector (lowering costs). International expe-
rience shows several ways of improving efficiency within the sector through increasing
competition and changes in motivating management (e.g. systems of pool or bilateral con-
tracts).
21 For more detailed information on possible tariff differentiation in the electricity sector see RC IPM-GET
Policy Paper PP/04/08 “The case for tariff differentiation in the Belarusian electricity sector”, http://
research.by/pdf/pp2008e04.pdf.
22 For more detailed information on possible ways of electricity sector restructuring see RC IPM-GET Policy
Paper PP/05/08 “Restructuring the Belarusian Electricity Sector: Setting the Agenda”, http://research.by/
pdf/pp2008e05.pdf or the second chapter of this publication.
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Appendix 1
General description of the infrastructure indicators
This appendix presents a brief description of the criteria for scoring each indicator on a scale
of 1 to 4.
1. Commercialisation and privatisation
1.1. Ownership
1.1.1. Natural monopoly. This indicator is concerned with the ownership of the natural
monopoly part of the infrastructure business, e.g., most of the networks. A score of
one means that the whole network is state owned; the score increases with an in-
creasing share of corporatized, privatized and newly constructed private fixed net-
works in the total length of networks. The maximum score 4.0 is reached with pri-
vate ownership of all networks.
1.1.2. Potentially competitive business. A potentially competitive business is an oper-
ator using networks to provide its services; it is a market related to a natural mo-
nopoly. A score of one implies that the businesses are part of the state owned nat-
ural monopoly. The score increases with separation, corporatisation and privatisa-
tion of existing operators, or with increased market penetration by newly established
private agents. The maximum is reached when all the businesses are in private
ownership.
1.1.3. Ancillary business. Ancillary businesses are concerned with network construction,
its maintenance, inputs supplies, and social infrastructure. A score of one means that
these businesses are state owned. The score increases with the degree of separa-
tion, corporatisation and privatisation, or with increases in new private establish-
ments.
1.2. Operation
1.2.1. Natural monopoly. A score of one is given when the natural monopoly is operat-
ed as a government department. The score increases with reorganisation into an
independent state agency or a company and establishment of an independent reg-
ulator. The maximum score is assigned if a private company manages the natural
monopoly, subject only to an independent regulator, established by law.
1.2.2. Natural monopoly planning and investment decisions. A score of one implies
political interference in business and investment decisions. The score increases as
commercial objectives such as profitability and operational efficiency grow in impor-
tance. The highest score applies if network extensions and new investment projects
are realized solely based on profitability considerations and reflect marginal social
costs.
1.2.3. Private sector participation in service contracts. A score of one means that the
private sector does not participate in construction, maintenance or rehabilitation,
etc. The score increases with increasing participation in these activities by the pri-
vate sector.
1.3. Organisational structure
1.3.1. Separation of natural monopoly and potentially competitive businesses. A
score of one means separation neither between the infrastructure and the service
providers’ managements, nor between the managements of different service pro-
viders. The score increases with unbundling of the industry. The highest score ap-
plies when different services are provided by separate private companies.
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1.3.2. Separation of ancillary businesses. A score of one means no separation of an-
cillary businesses from the natural monopoly or potentially competitive business-
es. The score increases with increasing degrees of separation. The maximum score
is assigned when ancillary services for the natural monopoly and for potentially
competitive businesses are supplied by the market.
1.3.3. Decentralisation. A score of one implies no or minimal decentralisation and increas-
es with increasing decentralisation. Decentralisation is both regional and function-
al and implies autonomy of decision making at the regional level concerning tariffs
and investments. The highest score is assigned when the industry is divided into
competing regional operators.
2. Tariff reform
2.1. Structure of tariffs
2.1.1. Political vs. regulated operators. A score of one implies strong political interfer-
ence in tariff setting. The score increases with declining political interference and
its transfer from the central government to the corresponding government agency
and finally to the regulatory body. The maximum score is reached for full cost re-
flective tariff setting by an infrastructure operator regulated by an independent
regulator.
2.1.2. Natural monopoly pricing. A score of one corresponds to pricing below cost ac-
companied by a substantial amount of cross-subsidisation. The score increases as
the tariff approaches the long-run marginal cost reflecting cost covering levels, with
cross-subsidisation declining.
2.1.3. Potentially competitive businesses pricing. A score of one means a lack of cost
reflective pricing. The score increases with markets becoming increasingly compet-
itive and prices approaching market equilibrium levels.
2.2. Payments
2.2.1. Intra-industry payment ratios. A score of one implies that arrears are constant-
ly accumulating and transactions between companies within an industry are basi-
cally non-monetary. The score increases as monetary settlements are carried out and
arrears approach zero.
2.2.2. Final consumer collection rates. A score of one means low revenue collection from
final consumers (households, companies, state organisations) and constantly accu-
mulating arrears. The score increases as progress with revenue collection is made
and services are fully paid for.
2.2.3. State indebtedness. A score of one corresponds to growing arrears for state com-
pensations to privileged consumers. The score increases as this indebtedness is
reduced to zero.
2.3. State funding
2.3.1. Subsidies level. A score of one means that some groups of consumers are heavily
subsidized by the state in an explicit or implicit form. Both the depth of the subsid-
isation and the distribution of subsidies are important. The government may pur-
sue a constant practice of debt forgiving and restructuring. Abstention from implicit
and explicit subsidies leads to improved scores.
2.3.2. Subsidies procedure. A score of one is assigned when the subsidies are directed
to service suppliers and are provided in non-transparent ways. The score improves
as the process becomes more transparent and income compensations replace price
compensations.
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3. Regulatory and institutional development
3.1. Effective regulatory institutions
3.1.1. Management selection of competitive businesses. A score of one means that
the management is appointed by state officials. The score increases when the man-
agement is elected by shareholders and reaches its maximum when the shareholders
are private companies or individuals.
3.1.2. Independence of regulator, insulation from political influence. A score of one
is assigned when a government department provides the service. The score increases
as a state commission is introduced and an independent regulator is established.
The highest score applies when an independent regulator acts according to law.
3.1.3. Transparency of regulation. A score of one implies an absence of legislation de-
fining clear rules of the game for businesses, and the obligations of government
bodies. The score increases with the development of legislation and its enforcement,
including when the decision-making becomes public. The maximum score is reached
when the performance of natural monopolies in an industry is regulated only by an
independent regulator in accordance with law, and all decisions are disclosed.
3.2. Access regulation. A score of one means that the access right is arbitrarily deter-
mined by the state or the state-owned operator. The score increases as access is
regulated by an independent regulator, later negotiated, and finally determined by
market mechanisms.
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Appendix 2
Explanations for the infrastructure indicator evaluations
RAILWAYS
1. Commercialisation and privatisation
1.1. Ownership
1.1.1. The basic rail network is 100% state owned. Rails linking enterprises to the basic
network are owned by the enterprises. 2009: 1.3.
1.1.2. Passenger and freight transportation is 100% state owned. However, companies
belonging to Belarusian Railways are separated and are independent legal entities.
There are a number of private forwarding companies operating at the market. 2009:
1.3.
1.1.3. All ancillary businesses are state owned and constitute a part of Belarusian Railways,
though they are divided into separated legal entities. Privatisation of some entities
has been scheduled for 2010, thus allowing to increase the index from 1.3 to 1.7.
2009: 1.7.
1.2. Operation
1.2.1. Since May 2006 a natural monopoly Belarusian Railways is a department of Minis-
try of Transport and Communication. 2009: 1.3.
1.2.2. According to the statute of Belarusian Railways the primary objective is satisfying
the needs of producers and of the population concerning transportation services.
Achieving profitability is secondary to the primary objective. There is also a certain
amount of state interference in the business and its investment decisions. 2009: 2.0.
1.2.3. There is private sector participation in service contracts. The tendering procedure
is quite transparent including postings of announcements on the Internet. Never-
theless the scale of outsourcing has not yet reached satisfactory levels. 2009: 1.7.
1.3. Organisational structure
1.3.1. No separation of potentially competitive businesses from the natural monopoly
operators has taken place so far. 2009: 1.0.
1.3.2. Ancillary businesses are independent legal entities within the structure of Belaru-
sian Railways. The share of non-core businesses in the structure of Belarusian Rail-
ways is very high. They include 38 healthcare and education institutions. 2009: 1.3.
1.3.3. Belarusian Railways consist of 6 regional companies. Altogether the company unites
92 legal entities. 2009: 2.0.
2. Tariff reform
2.1. Structure of tariffs
2.1.1. Tariffs for domestic transportation services are set independently from the railways by
the Ministry of Economy. Transit transportation tariffs are determined by internation-
al agreements. However, there is strong political influence on the tariff setting process,
as they are believed to affect the standard of living in the country. 2009: 1.7.
2.1.2. According to law, tariffs should cover cost of the service provided and allow devel-
opment of the railway network. As BR is both a natural monopoly operator and a
transportation services provider it is impossible to assess the percentage of reve-
nues channeled into railway network maintenance. Though, there is a considerable
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amount of cross-subsidisation especially towards suburban transportation (diesel and
electric trains): it is the most loss-making entity of BR (in 2008 revenues, exclud-
ing subsidies, covered only 35% of its costs, in 2009 this share should have fallen
as average tariff for this service reduced by 3.2% yoy. Earlier, between 2001 and
2006 tariffs for suburban transportation grew faster than for other kinds of passenger
and freight transportation, but this trend was put to an end in 2007. In 2008 and
2009 there was no tariff increase at all for suburban transportation, despite high
inflation rates. There are also cross subsidies between domestic and international
freight transportation, but they are rapidly decreasing. Domestic freight tariffs cov-
ered 92% of costs in 2009 (around 70% in previous years), which allows to increase
the score from 1.7 to 2.0. 2009: 2.0.
2.1.3. Belarusian Railways consistently makes profits (the 2009 rate of return was 29.7%).
Due to the distorted structure of tariffs, however, the amount of cross-subsidisation
is still very high, as suburbuan and national passenger and national freight trans-
portation suffer losses. 2009: 1.7.
2.2. Payments
2.2.1. A certain amount of indebtedness exists between the different enterprises within
Belarusian Railways. 2009: 2.0.
2.2.2. Revenue collection for passenger transportation is 100%. Starting from December
20, 2007 concessionary tickets were abolished. Earlier a large percentage of con-
sumers had privileges, especially on suburban transport: Privileged passengers
constituted around 20% of all passengers transported. However, for the summer
period concessionary tickets are still available for pensioners. Free rider practices
on suburban transport is not widespread. Some firms that use freight transporta-
tion services are regularly indebted to Belarusian Railways. 2009: 2.3.
2.2.3. In practice the government covered only a slight margin of losses of Belarusian
Railways caused by providing privileged consumers with service. 2009: 1.0.
2.3. State funding
2.3.1. Some consumer groups, especially users of suburban and intercity trains, are sub-
sidized at the expense of enterprises that ship their goods by railway. Coverage of
losses resulting from the provision of services at low tariffs by the state is margin-
al. 2009: 1.0.
2.3.2. According to law the government is obliged to cover all railway expenses, which are
incurred as a result of providing privileges to certain categories of consumers. In
practice the procedure of price compensation is not disclosed. 2009: 1.0.
3. Regulatory and institutional development
3.1. Effective regulatory institutions
3.1.1. The CEO of Belarusian Railways is appointed directly by the President. His deputies
are appointed by the Council of Ministers. 2009: 1.3.
3.1.2. Since 2006 Belarusian Railways is a department of Ministry of Transport and Com-
munication holding the rights of a legal entity. Thus, the practice of administrative
intervention in particular activities of the company is legitimized. 2009: 1.3.
3.1.3. The rules for operating Belarusian Railways are clearly defined in a number of leg-
islative documents. Yet the decision-making procedures have not been made open
to the public. 2009: 1.7.
3.2. Access regulation: Access by outside firms to the market is not possible. 2009: 1.0.
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ROADS
1. Commercialisation and privatisation
1.1. Ownership
1.1.1. Roads are 100% in state and communal ownership. 2009: 1.0.
1.1.2. State transportation enterprises are separated into independent legal entities, each
of which operates in a certain region. Private urban transportation was highly de-
veloped in some towns, reaching 50% market share. Since edict 760 came into force
this figure has dropped significantly, leading to the deterioration of the index. Pri-
vate freight transportation enterprises and individual entrepreneurs provide about
80% of the total amount of services. 2009: 1.3.
1.1.3. Ancillary businesses are state owned. All of them are independent legal entities
separated from road management and approximately 23% are incorporated. 2009:
1.7.
1.2. Operation
1.2.1. The natural monopoly operator Belavtodor operates as a government agency, i.e.
as part of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 2009: 1.3.
1.2.2. There is political interference in the business and investment decisions of state owned
firms by state administrations including local offices. 2009: 1.3.
1.2.3. Road construction and maintenance is provided by state owned firms, 23% of which
are incorporated. There is private sector participation in service contracts through
tenders. Yet the scale of outsourcing has not reached satisfactory levels. 2009: 1.7.
1.3. Organisational structure
1.3.1. Road management is completely separated from freight and passenger transporta-
tion services. 2009: 3.0.
1.3.2. Road construction and maintenance are separated from the natural monopoly op-
erators. Cooperation between them is based on tendering procedures. 2009: 2.0.
1.3.3. The natural monopoly operators are divided into regional monopolies, although these
monopolies are heavily regulated by the central and local administrations. 2009: 1.7.
2. Tariff reform
2.1. Structure of tariffs
2.1.1. Although tariffs are politically determined, state owned firms have some freedom
in setting their own tariffs. This happens in towns where competition with private
contractors is stronger and the tariffs charged by state owned firms are lower. In-
vestment decisions are highly influenced by the state administrations. 2009: 2.0.
2.1.2. According to state legislation, road funding should derive from different tax pay-
ments, such as the tax on fuel, export duties and others. Earlier the greatest con-
tributor to the fund was a special turnover tax, applied to the price of all products,
but it was abolished in 2008. Also, user fees levied on truck companies depending
on the distance travelled and the truck’s parameters, are accumulated in the fund.
There is one state owned toll road (M1/E30 Brest – Minsk – Russian Federation
border), but revenues do not cover operational costs on this road. 2009: 2.0.
2.1.3. The trucking and bus transportation markets are competitive, though competition
in the urban transportation market is limited by excessively strict permit require-
ments. Tariffs on passenger transportation services of state-owned enterprises are
set by the Ministry of Economy, although the enterprises have some freedom to
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change them. The maximum tariffs for private passenger transportation are set by
oblast councils. Private freight transportation companies are free to set their own
tariffs. 2009: 1.7.
2.2. Payments
2.2.1. A certain, but not a significantly large amount of indebtedness between ancillary
services providers persists. 2009: 2.3.
2.2.2. Revenue collection for passenger transportation is close to 100%, though price com-
pensation for serving privileged passengers remains an issue. However, starting from
December 20, 2007 privileges for a wide range of passengers were abolished. Free
rider practices in urban transport are common. The revenues of public transport
enterprises relative to their costs continue to be low. The indicator remained un-
changed. 2009: 2.3.
2.2.3. State financing of road construction and repair in 2009 has not improved. The rev-
enues of the Road Fund have fallen by further 0.1% of GDP. Besides, expenditures
on agricultural issues constituted around 20% of the fund. However, the index has
not been changed, as the absence of progress can be attributed to the external factor
of the global economic crisis. 2009: 1.7.
2.3. State funding
2.3.1. The government used the cost-plus approach to cover loses of public transport firms
instead of compensating them for the cost of providing services to privileged con-
sumers, which would be in accordance with the law. State subsidies did not fully
cover costs of public transportation companies: The whole transport industry suf-
fered losses of 4.8%. In many cases the prices charged by private firms resemble
those of their public competitors (price discrimination). Indicator remained un-
changed. 2009: 1.3.
2.3.2. Subsidies are directed straight to the service providers in a non-transparent way.
2009: 1.3.
3. Regulatory and institutional development
3.1. Effective regulatory institutions
3.1.1. Management of all state owned companies is appointed by the state administrations,
either central or local. 2009: 2.0.
3.1.2. Belavtodor, the monopoly road operator is a department of the Ministry of Transport.
Road maintenance companies and transportation companies are separate legal
entities. 2009: 1.7.
3.1.3. There are clear rules of operation for the natural monopoly described in legislative
acts. However, the decision making process is not disclosed to the public. Decisions
are highly politically influenced. 2009: 1.7.
3.2. Access regulation: Access is regulated by licensing. At the local level route ten-
dering procedures are not transparent. The rules of sharing out routes among var-
ious contractors are not clearly defined and public control is lacking. The regulato-
ry framework continued to be unfavourable for urban transportation firms and en-
trepreneurs during 2009. Compared with public firms they receive unequal treat-
ment and continue to feel shock of the new legislation on individual entrepreneurs.
As a result, the market share of private providers of passenger transportation ser-
vices further decreased (from 4.7% in 2008 to 3.8% in 2009). Attempts to soften
the tax burden on the economy provided some benefits for passenger and freight
transportation firms. So the indicator remained unchanged. 2009: 2.0.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. Commercialisation and Privatisation
1.1. Ownership
1.1.1. The cable infrastructure is primarily owned by Beltelecom, it further extents fibre-
optic networks to the regions, thus providing better access to infrastructure both for
population and other providers. Still, the structure remains monopolistic. The indi-
cator does not change. 2009: 1.7.
1.1.2. Regional telecommunication enterprises are branches of Beltelecom. Internet pro-
viders are privately owned (except Beltelecom), some of which have a state share,
and competing with each other. Mîst mobile phone operators are privatized. The
indicator is the same in 2009: 2.3.
1.1.3. Some construction, infrastructure maintenance and other ancillary enterprises are
state owned, others are private. Beltelecom is solely responsible for the maintenance
of its networks. The indicator does not change. 2009: 2.0.
1.2. Operation
1.2.1. Beltelecom is an independent financial unit, but the Ministry of Communication and
Informatisation regulates the activities of Beltelecom. The indicator does not change.
2009: 1.3.
1.2.2. Officially, Beltelecom’s long-term target is increasing its earnings and profitability.
In reality, investment decisions are made upon approval of the Ministry of Commu-
nication and Informatisation. Participation in the socially oriented governmental
policies in the sphere of telecommunications is obligatory for Beltelecom. The indi-
cator does not change. 2009: 1.7.
1.2.3. The mobile phone networks were developed by private operators. Private sector
participates in service contracts and equipment supply by means of tenders. The
indicator does not change. 2009: 2.0.
1.3. Organisational structure
1.3.1. Beltelecom controls international traffic transfer. Beltelecom provides local and in-
ternational connections. Beltelecom is the only primary internet provider, while
secondary internet providers are mainly private companies that compete with
Beltelecom. Beltelecom strengthens its positions in the internet provision segment;
competition with the state monopoly remains intense. Mobile communication ser-
vices are provided by mixed ownership or private operators. The indicator does not
change. 2009: 2.3.
1.3.2. Ancillary businesses are independent legal entities. Cooperation between them and
Beltelecom is based on tendering procedures, some of which are announced via the
Beltelecom website. The indicator does not change. 2009: 2.3.
1.3.3. Regional companies remain integrated into Beltelecom. Local and international phone
connections are centralized. There are no competing regional operators in telecom-
munications. The indicator does not change. 2009: 1.3.
2. Tariff reform
2.1. Structure of tariffs
2.1.1. Beltelecom’s tariff policy remains under strong political influence. It is determined
by the state policy priorities. Tariffs for local phone calls are set by the Ministry of
Economy. Rates for international phone calls and charges for fixed network customer
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connections to the mobile networks are set by Beltelecom. Internet tariffs and prices
for mobile communications are set by providers. The indicator does not change.
2009: 2.7.
2.1.2. Local calls are subsidized by international calls. The indicator does not change. 2009:
2.3.
2.1.3. Mobile and internet providers’ charges are competitive and cover costs. Charges for
internet services are constantly decreasing. The indicator does not change. 2009:
3.7.
2.2. Payments
2.2.1. Payments within the sector are regular. A certain level of indebtedness still persists
in telecommunications, however it is decreasing. The indicator does not change.
2009: 3.3.
2.2.2. Households cover the tariffs for landline communications charged by Beltelecom. In
the case of non-payment they are disconnected. The arrears of legal entities are not
significant and falling. The indicator does not change. 2009: 3.3.
2.2.3. The indebtedness level is low. The indicator does not change. 2009: 3.3.
2.3. State funding
2.3.1. The below-cost tariffs for local phone calls and the provision of other services to
privileged customers are covered by profits generated by other Beltelecom activi-
ties (e.g., international connections and internet). Some debt restructuring has taken
place in the sector. The indicator does not change. 2009: 2.7.
2.3.2. Cross-subsidisation remains. Direct state subsidies are not significant and primari-
ly aid the building of new telecommunications networks and improving the access
to telecommunication services in rural areas. The indicator does not change. 2009:
1.3.
3. Regulatory and institutional development
3.1. Effective regulatory institutions
3.1.1. The top management of Beltelecom is appointed by the Ministry of Communication
and Informatisation. The managements of the mobile phone operators and the in-
ternet providers are selected by their shareholders. The indicator does not change.
2009: 2.0.
3.1.2. Beltelecom is a state enterprise. The telecommunications’ sector activities are reg-
ulated and controlled by the Ministry of Communication and Informatisation. Mo-
bile phone operators are not subordinated to the Ministry of Communication and
Informatisation, but the state (represented by Beltelecom) being the majority share-
holder in one of them influences the decision-making. The indicator does not change.
2009: 1.3.
3.1.3. The rules of the sector operation are determined by the legal acts. Administrative
regulation is strong. The decision-making process is not open to the public scruti-
ny and is influenced by the government policies. The indicator does not change.
2009: 1.3.
3.2. Access regulation. Access is provided through tender allocation and operations
licensing. The decisions made are not always transparent. The indicator does not
change. 2009: 1.7.
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GAS
1. Commercialisation and privatisation
1.1. Ownership
1.1.1 Gaszprom acquired the next 12.5% of the shares of Beltransgaz (having acquired
37.5% in 2009). The remaining shares of Beltransgaz belong to the state. The in-
dicator increased from 2.3 in 2008 to 2.7 in 2009.
1.1.2. Transportation and distribution of gas are unbundled. 11 enterprises which belong
to Beltopgaz (mainly mining peat) were corporatized, however 1005 of shares still
belong to the state. The indicator increased from 1.3 in 2008 to 1.7 in 2009.
1.1.3. Construction, infrastructure maintenance and other ancillary enterprises are most-
ly state owned and/or are controlled by the state concerns. 2009: 1.3.
1.2. Operation
1.2.1. The Ministry of Energy regulates activities of Beltransgaz and Beltopgaz regional
organisations (Oblgaz), but the enterprises function as independent financial units.
2009: 1.3.
1.2.2. Commercial goals are weak. Political influence on management and investment
decisions prevail. 2009: 1.7.
1.2.3. The role of private sector in providing service for the gas sector is minor. 2009: 2.3.
1.3. Organisational structure
1.3.1. Gas transportation is separated from distribution and sales. The concern Beltopgaz
deals with transportation and sales of gas to consumers. 2009: 1.7.
1.3.2. The enterprises that provide supporting services (delivery, installation) are separated
economically and organisationally. 2009: 2.0.
2. Tariff reform
2.1. Structure of tariffs
2.1.1. Price and tariff setting is still subject to strong political influence, and determined
by state priorities in economic development. Economic activities are separated from
regulatory functions. All important prices and tariffs are set by the Ministry of Econ-
omy. This ministry performs some functions of the regulatory body. 2009: 2.0.
2.1.2. Beltransgaz prices cover average costs. 2009: 2.3.
2.1.3. Overall revenues of enterprises that make up Beltopgaz cover costs. In general the
system of price formation is based on the cost plus method. Gas prices for domes-
tic consumers do not depend on the distance of gas delivery. There is cross subsid-
isation of households by industry. 2009: 2.3.
2.2. Payments
2.2.1. In 2009, debts were reduced and the share of cash payments maintained at a high
level. 2009: 3.3.
2.2.2. Enterprises, especially in the industrial sector improved their gas payments. Nev-
ertheless overdue debts of various consumers remain. 2009: 3.3.
2.2.3. Budget debts are low and they do not exceed the level of payment for monthly gas
consumption. 2009: 3.3.
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2.3. State funding
2.3.1. Some categories of consumers buy gas at preferential prices. In 2009 debt write-
off were not practiced and the amount of state funding was reduced. 2009: 2.7.
2.3.2. The procedure of granting subsidies lacks transparency and it does not target indi-
vidual consumers. However, one-time subsidies were not given. 2009: 2.7.
3. Regulatory and institutional development
3.1. Effective regulatory institutions
3.1.1. The top management of Beltransgaz and enterprises of Beltopgaz are appointed by
the Ministry of Energy subject to approval by the President. 2009: 1.0.
3.1.2. The Ministry of Economy performs some regulatory functions in the sector. 2009: 1.0.
3.1.3. Administrative regulation is strong not only in management and decision making,
but also in contract performance both of suppliers and consumers. There is no spe-
cific legislation that regulates the sector. 2009: 1.0.
3.2. Access regulation. In 2004 in order to increase openness and transparency in the
sector, the tariff for gas transportation via the Beltransgaz pipeline was introduced.
Furthermore, network access to the low-pressure network of Beltopgaz by third
parties was established. However, despite considerable improvements in access
regulation there are still numerous administrative barriers for third parties access.
2009: 2.0.
ELECTRICITY
1. Commercialisation and privatisation
1.1. Ownership
1.1.1. The enterprises of Belenergo are mainly 100% state property. 2009: 1.3.
1.1.2. Generation, transportation and distribution of electric power are not unbundled and
are mainly carried out by mostly state owned enterprises. 2009: 1.0.
1.1.3. Construction, infrastructure maintenance and other ancillary enterprises are most-
ly state owned and/or are controlled by the state concern. 2009: 1.3.
1.2. Operation
1.2.1. Ministry of Energy regulates the activities of the Belenergo enterprises, but the
enterprises function as independent financial units. 2009:1.3.
1.2.2. Commercial goals are weak. Political influence on management and investment
decisions is prevalent. 2009: 1.7.
1.2.3. Construction and infrastructure maintenance are provided not only by the enterprises
of Belenergo, some of which are private. 2009: 2.3.
1.3. Organisational Structure
1.3.1. There is no separation between production, distribution and sales. 2009: 1.0.
1.3.2. The enterprises that provide supporting services (delivery, installation) are separated
economically and organisationally, some of them are parts of the concern. 2009: 2.0.
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2. Tariff reform
2.1. Structure of Tariffs
2.1.1. The tariff setting is still strongly politically influenced. The Ministry of Economy sets
all important prices and tariffs. Economic activities are separated from regulatory
functions, some of which the Ministry of Economy is responsible for. 2009: 2.0.
2.1.2. Prices cover the average costs of Belenergo. However, cross subsidisation of heat-
ing by electricity still takes place. 2009: 2.3.
2.1.3. Overall revenues cover Belenergo’s costs. In general, the system of price setting is
based on the cost plus method. Electricity prices for domestic consumers do not
depend on the distance of electricity transmission. In 2009, prices for some consumer
groups remained below costs and the cross subsidisation was even increased. The
indicator went down from 2.3 in 2008 to 2.0 in 2009.
2.2. Payments
2.2.1. Since 2004, debts inside the sector were gradually reduced and the share of non-
cash payments among enterprises of the sector was practically liquidated. 2009: 3.3.
2.2.2. The level of payments, especially among industrial enterprises, increased. In 2009
they paid fully for current electricity consumption. Nevertheless debts stemming from
the past of various consumers remain. 2009: 3.3.
2.2.3. Budget debts are low and they do not exceed the average level of payment for
monthly electricity consumption. 2009: 3.3.
2.3. State funding
2.3.1. Some categories of consumers buy electricity at preferential prices. New debts are
restructured. In 2009 no debt write-off was practiced. 2009: 2.7.
2.3.2. The procedure of granting subsidies lacks transparency and it does not target indi-
vidual consumers. One-time subsidies were not given. 2009: 2.7.
3. Regulatory and institutional development
3.1. Effective regulatory institutions
3.1.1. Top management of the enterprises of Belenergo are appointed by the Ministry of
Energy subject to approval by the President. 2009:1.0.
3.1.2. Only household tariffs are set externally from Belenergo (by the Council of Minis-
tries). Belenergo declares tariffs to the Ministry of Economy. Belenergo is managed
by the Ministry of Energy. 2009: 1.0.
3.1.3. Administrative regulation is strong not just in management and decision making, but
also in the contract performance both of suppliers and consumers. There is no spe-
cific legislation that regulates the sector. 2009: 1.0.
3.2. Access regulation to the power lines network is provided by Belenergo, neverthe-
less it is not closed. 2009: 1.0.
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About the project
The joint project of the German Economic Team in Belarus and the IPM Research Center
was launched in May 2003 with support of the Ministry of Economy (Germany) under the
TRANSFORM program. The main objective of the project is to support the Belarusian gov-
ernment in the field of economic policy. To achieve this, the team of experts regularly pre-
pares analytical papers on different topical issues and presents recommendations to the
officials from the National Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions involved in the process of formation and im-
plementation of economic policy.
Activities
− Regular analysis of the economy of Belarus;
− Monitoring of main sectors of the economy;
− Promotion of professional dialogue between Belarusian and German experts on
important issues for the economic development of Belarus.
Team
German Economic Team in Belarus
− Prof. Dr. Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, agriculture and real sector, co-leader
− Dr. Ricardo Giucci, macroeconomy and financial sector, co-leader
− Robert Kirchner, macroeconomy and financial sector, consultant
− Dr. Georg Zachmann, energy economics and econometrics, consultant
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− Dr. Igor Pelipas, monetary economics and applied econometrics, Director of the IPM
Research Center
− Dr. Irina Tochitskaya, international economics, Deputy Director of the Research
Center
− Dr. Elena Rakova, energy sector, structural and competition policy, enterprise re-
form
− Alexander Chubrik, M.A. in Economics, economic growth and monetary policy
− Dzmitry Kruk, M.A. in Economics, banking sector and macroeconomic modelling
− Anastasiya Glambotskaya, M.A. in Economics, M.A. in International Political Econ-
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Analytical materials
Current research products and publications of the project group are available via the In-
ternet (http://research.by/get).
Belarusian Monthly Economic Review (BMER)
A monthly bulletin has been published since October 2002. It provides readers with recent
news on politics and economics, covering such sectors of the economy as the real sector,
structural trends, the external sector, public finance, monetary policy and the banking sector.
Policy Papers
Analytical materials on specific economic issues providing policy recommendations for the
government and other organisations involved in the process of creating and implementing
economic policy.
PP/01/08 Pension System in Belarus: Major Challenges and the Ways of Meeting Them
PP/02/08 The competitiveness of Belarusian agriculture
PP/03/08 The International Financial Crisis and Belarus: Risks and Policy Implications
PP/04/08 The case for tariff differentiation in the Belarusian electricity sector
PP/05/08 Restructuring the Belarusian Electricity Sector: Setting the Agenda
PP/06/08 Reinsurance Practices in Belarus: Barriers to Insurance Sector Development and
Investments Limitation
PP/07/08 Impact of FDI on Trade and Technology Transfer in Belarus: Empirical Evidence
and Policy Implications
PP/08/08 Recent Developments and Impact of the International Financial Crisis on Bela-
rus
PP/01/09 The Belarusian Insurance Market Characteristics in the Context of Economic Lib-
eralization: Analysis and Policy Recommendations
PP/02/09 Privatisation in Belarus during the Global Financial Crisis: No time to Lose
PP/03/09 The Belarusian Electricity Sector: Financing Sources for Investments
PP/04/09 Perspectives and Challenges for Economic Policy in Belarus during the Global
Crisis: Evidence from Macroeconometric Modelling
PP/05/09 Policy Measures to Attract FDI: An Overview of International Experience and
Recommendations for Belarus
PP/06/09 Official Reserve Adequacy in Belarus: Analysis and Recommendations
PP/07/09 Perspectives for Fiscal Policy and Budget Deficit Financing in Belarus
PP/08/09 Eastern Partnership: Prospects for Intensifying the Belarus – EU Relations in the
Energy Sector?
Belarus Infrastructure Monitoring
Monitoring of the current situation and the perspectives for the development of the ener-
gy, telecommunications and transport sectors in Belarus. The following sectors are moni-
tored: electricity, gas, communication and communication services, railways and roads.
